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Abstract 
 
Eurosceptic parties across Europe are on the rise, and since the Eurocrisis their calls for 
reform of or even exit from the European Union have gained more prominence. One such 
party, The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), shocked political commentators in 
2013 with their huge rise in the opinion polls and successes in local council elections across 
England. The aim of this thesis is to explain the success of UKIP in those elections, using 
Boston in Lincolnshire as a specific case study. This case study involves investigating the 
research problem from a number of different perspectives, analysing political factors, 
demographics and media. It then seeks to analyse whether pre-existing hypotheses to explain 
the success of UKIP and similar parties can be applied to the specific case of Boston. 
 
The findings of the study are that the low turnout at the elections, especially of Conservative 
voters, gave UKIP the opportunity to win. This turnout can be explained by a number of 
factors, including a lack of political competition from other mainstream parties. The visit to 
the town of Nigel Farage also contributed to success of UKIP in the area, although this 
appeared to have still relied on the low turnout of Conservative voters. Finally, the large 
amount of low skilled immigration in the area may have also contributed to the spread of 
support for UKIP, although it is possible that this could also be down to deprivation levels in 
the area, as this appears to be apparent in the same geographic areas.  
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1.0 - Introduction 
 
A common remark about politics is that ‘all politics is local’. Despite having a number of 
Members of the European Parliament, the eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party 
are yet to gain election to the national parliament of the UK. Ford suggested that ‘UKIP may 
carry on rising in the national polls, but without local strongholds they will win nothing in a 
general election’ (Ford, 2013). In May 2013 however, they recorded significant victories in 
the local council elections. The UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system has always been 
seen as a significant hurdle to smaller parties, but on this occasion UKIP showed that they 
were becoming increasingly capable of jumping this hurdle. 
 
Despite this, Duverger’s Law makes it difficult to break into the 2 or 2.5 party system of the 
UK, and it is hard to immediately identify areas where UKIP could be successful. Rowena 
Mason of The Telegraph stated that there are not many counties in the UK that are as ‘true 
blue’ as Lincolnshire ‘…or that is what the Tories thought, before Nigel Farage’s Ukip threw 
a splurge of purple across the rural heartland this week’ (Mason, 2013). 
 
Mason asks the question why such a solidly Conservative voting area suddenly turned to 
UKIP in the local elections. 16 UKIP councillors were elected in Lincolnshire, the home 
county of Margaret Thatcher and dominated by the Conservatives for a century. Mason points 
out that UKIP’s leader, Nigel Farage had paid special attention to Lincolnshire and in 
particular the town of Boston, which has been nicknamed ‘Little Poland’ due to the large 
amount of Eastern Europeans now living there. It is Mason’s question that this thesis intends 
to explain, concentrating particularly on the town of Boston that was the focus of Farage’s 
attention. 
 
Indeed, the political commentator Fraser Nelson described Boston as now being a ‘UKIP 
town’ (Nelson, 2013) following the shock election results. Lincolnshire was not the only 
place that UKIP had success in the local council elections, but it was the town of Boston that 
stood out nationally, mainly due to the scale of success that UKIP enjoyed there. In fact, if 
the local election results in Boston were to be replicated in a General Election, the UKIP 
would have seen their first Member of Parliament elected. This is why I have chosen Boston, 
to try and find out why this was the case. 
 
UKIP, normally seen as more of party of the south, had made a breakthrough in a part of the 
country nobody expected, and seemingly from a very low starting point. As Mason 
mentioned earlier though, Boston is no ordinary town. Peter Hitchens (2011) of the Daily 
Mail referred to the town as ‘Boston Lincolngrad’ in an article that was widely criticised and 
accused of being inflammatory. There were numerous other pieces in the national media 
detailing the wide scale immigration from the new EU countries that this small Lincolnshire 
town had experienced in a short period of time. In January 2013 a local person appeared on 
the BBC’s flagship political debating show Question Time and told viewers that the town 
could no longer cope with the influx and was at breaking point. 
 
Because of immigration clearly being an issue in the town, this thesis will explore research 
that has already been conducted on the impact of immigration on the support of populist 
parties in Europe. Ford (2012) and others have described UKIP as being ‘populist’ and their 
ideology and background will also be discussed to justify their inclusion in this category. 
This research on immigration varies from those who see it as a cultural conflict or integration 
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issue (Goodwin 2011b, Oesch 2008, O’Connell 2005), a labour market issue (Docquier et al 
2010, Sadka & Razin 1995, Hansen et al 2010), a phenomenon in itself (Golder 2003), a skill 
level oriented problem (Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller 2012) or a proximity and threat issue 
(Warmebol 2007). It is the last two that will later form the basis of my investigations in this 
area. 
 
Because it is an election I am focusing on, I will also be trying to analyse political factors, to 
ascertain whether any of these reasons may have contributed towards the success of UKIP. 
The Huffington Post (2013) have suggested it is a split in the Conservative vote; Nelson 
(2013) their mutation from an EU protest party to a party of the working class; Ford, 
Goodwin & Cutts (2012) explained by core and strategic voting; Dunt (2013) taking votes 
from mainstream parties that the Liberal Democrats can no longer do; and finally Arzheimer 
& Carter (2003) who suggest that turnout is responsible and that voters use this to register 
their protest at mainstream parties during second order elections. Again, it is this last theory 
that I later focus on. 
 
The vast media coverage surrounding the elections suggests that media based issues may also 
be worth investigating, especially considering the high profile of UKIP leader Nigel Farage. 
‘As one put it, he is a politician they ‘could bear to have a pint with’. In short Farage (like 
Boris Johnson) has cultivated an unconventional image which helps him to get away with 
rather more than the average politician.’ (Hayton, 2013). I will investigate whether this is 
actually the case and whether the ‘Farage factor’ had any bearing on the election results. I 
analyse hypotheses put forward by Usherwood (2013) that coverage leads to better polling, 
which in turn leads to more coverage; Hopmann et al (2012) that tone an visibility have an 
effect on results; and Bos (2012) who suggests that the more successful populist leaders are 
the ones who can seem similar to established politicians. 
 
Whilst I focus on three testable hypotheses under the immigration, political and media 
categories to try to explain the success of UKIP in Boston, I expect that some of the other 
theories discussed may also serve as further explanatory factors of various phenomena. 
However, whilst I expect there to be a number of micro factors that are responsible for 
UKIP’s success, especially in individual council wards, this thesis seeks to identify the most 
important factors. Before I begin with my theoretical framework, hypotheses and testing, I 
first introduce concepts such as euroscepticism and previous research relating to immigration 
in Europe, UKIP and the national picture in terms of election results. 
 
 
 
1.1 - Disposition 
 
This thesis will be structured as followed: I begin by introducing the concept of 
euroscepticism and its various forms across Europe. I then look at previous research 
concerning immigration in Europe and its relationship with support for populist parties. The 
history of the United Kingdom Independence Party, where their support comes from and 
what current academic theory says about them comes next. I also discuss survey data on their 
voters and profile their leader Nigel Farage. I then discuss the current electoral picture 
nationally, looking at some of UKIP’s most recent results and what we can understand from 
them and from the opinions of various experts. 
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Following this I then set out my theoretical framework and methodology, also giving details 
of any ethical issues or issues of bias that may arise in my research. The thesis then focuses 
on the three hypotheses that I intend to test and what data and material I will be analysing in 
order to do this. The three main sections of my research, looking at political, demographic 
and media related factors that could have influenced the results in Boston then follow. I 
conclude with a discussion of the results and whether my hypotheses have been confirmed, or 
whether new hypotheses have been created as a result of my research. I then suggest further 
research that could be carried out to continue studies in this area. 
 
 
2.0 - Previous Research 
 
2.1 - Euroscepticism 
 
Before focusing on UKIP, it is important to grasp the idea of what euroscepticism actually is, 
why parties are Eurosceptic, and the reasons why they are becoming more relevant to the 
political world. Therefore we will look first at why different political parties within the 
European Union are either supportive or sceptical of integration. I will be comparing these 
parties not only with a traditional left/right analysis, but will also be looking at the GAL/TAN 
(green, alternative, libertarian & traditional, authoritarian, nationalism) dimension used by 
Hooghe, Marks & Wilson (2002). Added to this I will be looking at certain countries on an 
individual case basis, and whether there are also non-ideological factors that influence their 
attitudes to the EU. 
 
To begin with it is important to look at historical attitudes towards ‘Europe’. In the past, we 
have seen those on the political left characterise the European Union in its various guises as 
being nothing more than a capitalist project. It is an organisation that is geared towards the 
free market and liberal economics. For others, it has been a way of uniting countries and 
avoiding further horrific conflicts, following two World Wars. We have then seen more 
recent criticism from the political right, citing the loss of national sovereignty and traditions, 
and also criticism about austerity measures that have been imposed as part of bailout 
conditions. Political attitudes towards the European Union have evolved as much as the 
Union itself. 
 
The British Conservative Party is a particularly intriguing example. It was the Conservative 
Party that originally took the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community in 
1973. Their Prime Minister at the time, Edward Heath, was seen as a moderate within the 
party and was enthusiastic about membership. He was defeated following the Labour Party’s 
election triumph in 1974 however, and they promised a referendum on continued 
membership of the EEC. The UK public voted to remain as EEC members in 1975, and to 
this day it is still the only referendum on Europe to be held in the UK. 
 
How times change.  In 2011 we saw a vote in the House of Commons where backbench 
Conservative MPs have tried to force a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the 
EU (in that they wanted a withdrawal/status quo/reform referendum to be put to the public). 
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All three main UK political parties whipped against this proposal however, and their 
leadership made clear their support for continued membership of the European Union, 
although to different extents (with the Labour Party now seen as a pro-EU party). Since then, 
Prime Minister David Cameron has himself called for a renegotiation of the UK’s 
relationship with the EU and has then promised to hold a referendum on this renegotiated 
relationship if the Conservatives win the next General Election. Whilst making clear his 
preference to remain within a reformed EU, this has left the door open for a possible exit if 
the renegotiation (if there is a renegotiation) is not acceptable to the British public. This 
campaign has been named ‘Let Britain Decide’. So far they are the only party to have 
pledged a referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union. Can we continue to 
look at the old left/right dimensions to explain this occurrence though? 
 
This is what Hooghe et al (2002) decided to research, looking at not just the British situation, 
but that around the rest of the EU. ‘We find strong associations between party score on the 
GAL/TAN dimension, overall support for European integration, and support for particular 
aspects of European integration, including environmental policy, asylum policy, and 
strengthening the European Parliament. (Hooghe et al, 2002, p985). They were surprised that 
this research looking at the ‘new politics’ of GAL & TAN had such a correlation on issues 
surrounding European integration. 
 
From a British perspective this is even more apparent. ‘Given the endemic conflict between 
neoliberalism, oriented on the Left/Right dimension, and nationalism, oriented on GAL/TAN 
dimension, we hypothesize that conservative parties are particularly prone to such fissures 
(Hooghe et al, p982). The Conservative Party, despite being firmly on the right from an 
economic perspective, were seen as taking a more TAN approach since the election of 
Margaret Thatcher as leader following Heath. The splits in the Conservative Party, such as 
backbench rebellions over the Maastricht Treaty still influence the attitudes of the party 
towards Europe. Kenneth Clarke, a ‘big hitter’, but firm supporter of the EU and at one point 
the Euro saw his chances of becoming leader dashed on numerous occasions because of his 
pro-European views. 
 
Hix and Hoyland suggest that domestic politics also play a part in how political parties view 
the EU. They use the example of the British Conservatives, for whom EU policies were 
described as being ‘socialism through the back door’, with Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 Bruges 
speech famously stating that they ‘…have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the 
state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level.’. Hix & Hoyland then 
contrast this with the French perspective, whereby the French Socialists see the liberalising 
effects of the single market, along with privatisation and state aids policies, being more of an 
‘Anglo-Saxon plot’ to undermine French workers (Hix & Hoyland, 2011, p127). 
 
So whilst ideological positions and preferences with policy are important, it is the domestic 
policy context that they are set within that helps us to understand why the ‘right’ in Britain 
are critical of the EU, whilst the French right are more supportive. This also helps to explain 
why the opposite could be said of the British and French ‘left’. 
 
This is interesting when looking at the radical/populist right as the same kind of pattern 
emerges. The Danish Peoples Party, Vlaams Belang and The Austrian Freedom Party, whilst 
all being eurosceptic, all have very different outlooks to other radical parties, such as the 
French National Front or the Italian National Alliance (Hooghe et al, 2002, p979). They 
primarily see the benefits of free trade and the market. This would appear to have a lot in 
8 
 
common with what Hix & Hoyland said about Anglo-Saxon attitudes, and may explain why 
the French are more suspicious. 
 
Euroscepticism in its various forms appears to have spread. ‘It is clear that Euroskepticism is 
not just another English vice. As a minimum, Europe is no longer part of consensus, non-
partisan politics in many Member States, not least the new ones.’  (Weiler, 2005, p231). This 
raises another interesting area, in that we must now look at Eastern and Central European 
members. Where do their attitudes fit in with this Anglo-Saxon/French way of thinking? 
Does their past play a role? 
 
Some parties obviously felt that the EU would help them to gain access to their own system 
and that it would improve democracy (through conditionality requirements in the build-up to 
membership). If they are in favour of free market economics then this could also have played 
a role and led to more enthusiasm. However, once a country becomes a member of the 
European Union they may not feel the same obligation to fit in with many of these 
conditional requirements. 
 
Vachudova (2008, p866) believes different Eastern European states are at different stages 
with their political parties and systems. Romania and Bulgaria are more ‘left TAN’ and 
eurosceptic, whilst Poland and Hungary are less left TAN populated, with less 
euroscepticism. This is because they had already started democratic reforms in the 1980s. 
Czechs voted out communists in 1990 and followed a liberal trajectory, but are put forward as 
a strange example, with the ODS being ‘right’ TAN and the KSCM (communist) ‘left’ TAN. 
Both are also seen as eurosceptic, so it could be argued that there are comparisons that could 
be made here with the British Conservatives. 
 
Of course, the Conservative Party are not the only eurosceptics in the UK. In the early 1990s 
we saw Sir James Goldsmith set up the Referendum Party in protest at the Maastricht Treaty. 
We now also see the United Kingdom Independence Party who have several MEPs and 
advocate complete withdrawal from the European Union, along with the ‘cross-party’ but 
effectively right leaning Better Off Out campaign, which is supported by several eurosceptic 
Conservatives. They go further than simply saying that Maastricht needs revisiting. Even 
looking back to the early 90s and before treaties like Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, Weiler 
points out that Goldsmith ‘…focussed his campaign on the alleged evils of the Maastricht 
Treaty and its potential sequel. But if you scrutinize his manifesto with care you will see that, 
like many avowed Euroskeptics, it is the constitutional framework, already in place long 
before Maastricht, which is at the source of his rage’ (Weiler, 2005, p223). It is this 
sovereignty issue that seems to stand out when analysing euroscepticism on the political 
right, and for them is an issue where the status quo is clearly not acceptable. 
 
There are also some very interesting cases of euroscepticism from places you would not 
normally expect to find it. Look at the first referendum in Ireland over the Lisbon Treaty for 
example. The mainstream parties were all in favour of a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum, and 
only the Sinn Fein party (who I would argue are ‘left’ and TAN) and independent 
organisations were campaigning for a ‘No’ vote. Indeed, some of the posters displayed 
slogans such as ‘People Died For Your Freedom – Don’t Throw It Away’, with references to 
the Declaration of Irish Independence. The ‘No’ vote won, and a similar result also happened 
in France. Could this be a sign that public opinion was not necessarily in line with the views 
of the political elites? This was even more surprising in the Ireland had always been held up 
as an example of how the EU could benefit smaller nations. 
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It should be pointed out though, that for the most part national governments are broadly in 
favour of European Union membership for many reasons including: the prevention of further 
conflicts between states; the solving of the ‘German Question’; keeping Europe democratic; 
protecting small countries and finally for cooperation in economic areas etc. Many on the left 
have softened their attitudes to what was originally to them a ‘capitalist club’, and you will 
now see Greens, such as those in Germany, viewing the EU’s power to implement wide-
ranging environmental policies as a good thing. 
 
Even the political mainstream have run into arguments with the European Union hierarchy 
however. In France, President Sarkozy was criticised over the handling of Romanian gypsies 
and more recently there have been issues with Danish border controls, despite them being 
part of the Schengen area. Conflict with the EU has seemingly come from the political right, 
or from TAN parties, trying to protect what they see as their traditional values and national 
sovereignty. Since the recent recession there has also been controversy over one of the EU’s 
great principles, that of the free movement of labour, and of low skilled migrant workers 
from the East. 
 
It could be argued that the EU is centrist in its approach. One major area of controversy 
surfaced in 2000 when there were problems forming a government in Austria. When neither 
the socialists nor the conservatives could find a compromise, the FPÖ (Freedom Party) and 
their controversial leader Jörg Haider came forward as a potential coalition partner. Many 
referred to the FPÖ at the time as a ‘far right’ party, and leaders of the EU’s member states 
were quick to announce that they would be imposing bi-lateral political sanctions on Austria 
were they to enter into a coalition agreement. This led to a threat from Austria to hold a 
referendum on effectively using their veto to stop the EU progressing in areas. For some, the 
threat from the leaders of EU states was an abuse of their powers, trying to influence what 
had been a democratically contested election in a member state. For others it was an example 
of the EU trying to protect its principles and stop any further potential problems. For many 
eurosceptics though, this could be used as an example of the EU interfering with national 
sovereignty, albeit only to a limited extent.  
 
The move was seen to have backfired and instead turned some Austrians, many of whom 
would have never voted for the FPÖ, against the EU for what they saw as interference and 
unfair treatment of their country. Similar parties have also supported governments in both 
Denmark and the Netherlands since this incident, but have not been official coalition 
partners, which may be to avoid similar conflicts. The stand out example is Italy, where 
Berlusconi has been in coalition with both the National Alliance and the Northern League. 
Perhaps the unstable nature of Italian politics is what has allowed this to go through without 
great opposition however. 
 
The gap between political elites and the general public must also be considered. In Finland, 
yet another country you would not associate with euroscepticism, the True Finns party 
shocked many with their results in recent national elections. This was seen as a reflection of 
Finnish anger towards various ‘bailouts’. In France, the Front National leader Marine Le Pen 
wants out of the Euro and Arnaud Montebourg, a left wing protectionist who opposes 
globalisation, came an impressive third in the French Socialist primary. Going back to Britain 
again, the debate over the nature of EU membership rages on, though has at times been seen 
as ‘off limits’ to those leading the mainstream parties. Grzymala-Busse and Innes (2003, p72) 
feel that this forced conformity across the EU has closed basic ideological debates on public 
policy. They suggest that because there is ‘no alternative’ to this there is a rise of anti-EU 
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politicians who substitute populism for debate over ideology or policy. According to 
Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2011), public support for EU membership has been 
dropping in the United Kingdom in recent years. 
 
I would agree with Hooghe, Marks & Wilson about the importance of the GAL/TAN 
dimension, and that the old left/right analysis can no longer be used in isolation to understand 
attitudes towards European integration. Added to this it is also clear that historical factors, the 
nature of a country’s domestic policy and how political parties’ leadership connect with their 
parties and the wider public also play a pivotal role. 
 
 
(European Commission, Eurobarometer, 2011) 
 
2.2 –Immigration and populist parties in 
the rest of Europe. 
 
As has been previously referred to, there are similarities between the success of UKIP and 
other populist parties in Europe. Much of the research conducted has focused on the factors 
that may have led to increased support for these parties. Whilst there is argument over 
whether you can generalise about parties that differ from country to country, there are in 
some cases clear similarities, and it is therefore worthwhile to see if the same factors can be 
seen to apply across national boundaries. 
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In Austria, Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller found that the FPÖ gained votes when the 
immigrant population in areas increased. However, the skill composition of immigrants was 
also an important factor, as the proximity of low and medium skilled immigrants caused 
voters to the FPÖ. Conversely, high skilled immigration had an insignificant or negative 
effect on FPÖ votes (Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller, 2012, p27). This is an interesting finding, 
as the case we will be focusing on (Boston) has a large number of unskilled workers in 
industries such as agriculture. 
 
In Belgium, it has been suggested that areas surrounding high immigrant concentrated areas 
are susceptible to high levels of support for the Vlaams Belang. Tough inner city areas with 
high unemployment are not necessarily linked to support for populist radical right parties. In 
particular, Warmenbol discusses the ‘inkblot theory’, whereby districts that do not have, or 
have only recently had these problems, tend to be more vulnerable to increased Vlaams 
Belang support. Warmenbol also links this with the ‘threat hypothesis’, whereby they will 
vote for a radical populist party to ‘…keep distance and prevent their own area from 
becoming like the stereotypical inner-city neighbourhood, a phenomenon which is also called 
the ‘halo-effect’ (Warmenbol, 2007, p20). 
 
Again, this is another factor that is worth investigating. Have UKIP been successful in the 
areas surrounding those with high concentrations of migrants? If so then we should not only 
look at Boston, but also any areas that are immediately surrounding it to see if there has been 
an effect on voting and whether this ‘threat hypothesis’ can be observed. Can evidence be 
found that this also links in with the Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller assertion that the skills 
composition of migrants also matters? 
 
For O’Connell, the levels of poverty in an area are not necessarily linked to people supporting 
populist parties. Whilst those with greater wealth were less hostile in their attitudes towards 
immigrants and ethnic minorities, he states that many successes for right-wing populist 
parties have been in countries where they are generally better off. Although he does point out 
that in these countries immigrants are less likely to be perceived as an economic threat, an 
increase in their numbers can lead a conflict on issues surrounding integration (O'Connell, 
2005, p74). 
 
This could explain the success of populist parties in the Scandinavian countries, where the 
standard of living is very high in comparison to other countries (and some may argue in the 
United Kingdom also). This suggests that factors such as culture may play a more important 
role in the success of these parties. 
 
Golder has produced some of the main work relating to the effect of migration on votes for 
populist parties. He emphasises that unemployment on its own doesn't help populist parties 
increase their vote share, and that this only increases when there are large numbers of 
foreigners in the country. Although he has also stated that ‘…higher levels of immigration 
always help populist parties, irrespective of the level of unemployment.' (Golder, 2003, 
p460). The assertion that higher levels of immigration always help populist parties is a bold 
one, and is a variable that could also be tested as part of a study. 
 
Going back to the non-economic concerns, Goodwin has suggested that whilst economics are 
a factor, it is the cultural element that is key. More culturally distinct groups, such as 
Muslims for example, can be seen as threatening national cultures, traditions and ways of life. 
He refers to previous work by Sniderman whereby these feelings are seen to trump those 
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relating to any economic threat. 'It is similarly reflected in the Transatlantic Trends survey...' 
(Goodwin, 2011, p7). This appears to back up Golder in the sense that unemployment alone 
is not necessarily the major factor. 
 
Goodwin's views echo those espoused by Oesch, who looked specifically at the levels of 
support that 'workers' had for the parties and the reasons why. Cultural identity is seen as 
more important than economic concerns. 'The formula for Blocher’s, Dewinter’s, Hagen’s, 
Haider’s, or Le Pen’s electoral success seems clear: “It’s the identity, stupid!”(Oesch, 2008, 
p370). 
 
Goodwin then further goes on to say that this is also related to their unhappiness with the 
policies of mainstream alternatives, and that far from being irrational, the people who vote for 
these parties have very clear goals. ‘… they want immigration reduced and rising diversity 
curtailed or halted altogether. They are deeply concerned about these issues, and profoundly 
dissatisfied with the current response offered by mainstream parties. (Goodwin, 2011b, pxi). 
This unhappiness with the political mainstream appears to be a recurring theme with research 
into populist parties. 
 
Whilst cultural threat appears to be one of the main themes, can it be argued that migrants are 
also causing lower wages and increased inequality however? Docquier et al produced an 
interesting study suggesting that countries are losing more of their highly skilled workers and 
it is a brain drain situation, rather than a case of being dragged down by migration. 
‘…immigrants are generally imperfect substitutes for non-migrants bringing skills that only 
partially compensate the losses due to emigration.’(Docquier, Özden & Peri, 2010, p23) 
 
Sadka and Razin have suggested in a study that if the labour market is not functioning 
properly then migration can make things worse. They also suggest that unskilled migration 
can also put pressure on the welfare state, and that there is an inability to exclude them from 
this. Immigration can be more of a benefit to the native born population therefore if the 
labour markets function better and if welfare programmes are less comprehensive (Sadka & 
Razin, 1995, p316). This is interesting, as we know that wages in Scandinavian countries are 
generally higher than in other countries, and that the welfare state is especially renowned for 
being fairly comprehensive, yet in recent years they have seen a huge rise in the success of 
the Sweden Democrats, a populist right party. Hansen, Wahlberg & Faisal (2010, p1) suggest 
that low wages of migrants is mainly a quality sorting exercise, and not to do with them 
lowering existing wages. This would back up the earlier point made by Docquier. 
 
So, from the research that has already been conducted there appears to be a number of 
variables that are continually referred to as being responsible for increased support of 
populist and APE parties across Europe. These will be analysed during this study to see if 
they are still relevant and can be applied to the British case of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party and in particular in the Boston area. 
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2.3 - UKIP, their successes, policies and 
supporters 
 
The United Kingdom Independence Party, or UKIP for short, was first formed in 1993 by Dr 
Alan Sked as a response to the controversial Maastricht Treaty. They were very much a 
minor party however, and were in the shadow of the Referendum Party, led by Sir James 
Goldsmith (BBC News, 2013). Goldsmith’s death and the subsequent winding-up of the 
Referendum Party in 1997 were to lead to later successes for UKIP however. 
 
 
(BBC News, 2013) 
 
In the 1999 European Elections UKIP had their first MEPs elected, returning three members 
to the Parliament. The proportional electoral system used for the European Elections played a 
big part in this, as the first-past-the-post electoral system that the UK normally uses makes it 
very difficult for smaller parties to gain election. It was in the 2004 European Elections where 
UKIP made a real breakthrough however, overtaking the Liberal Democrats, and securing 3
rd
 
place with 12 MEPs. This year also represented a peak in UKIP’s membership figures, and 
the party boasted some celebrity supporters, such as the actress Joan Collins and the 
television presenter (and former Labour Member of Parliament) Robert Kilroy-Silk (widely 
known as just ‘Kilroy’). Kilroy-Silk was also one of their candidates, subsequently gaining 
election for the East Midlands constituency. 
 
This added media presence was to cause problems however. Things appeared to be happening 
a little too fast for UKIP.  Abedi & Lundberg cite the internal conflict when Kilroy-Silk 
wanted the party to focus on taking office, whereas many party members were more 
concerned with keeping their populist appeal and their status as an APE (Anti-Political 
Establishment party). For Abedi and Lundberg, a party’s organisational structure evolves 
over time, and important events can have implications on their abilities to handle them. For 
them, Kilroy arrived too early in UKIP’s life cycle (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009, p4). 
 
Kilroy-Silk did not last long, and after a failed leadership bid left the party to form his own 
unsuccessful movement, Veritas. Despite repeating their successes of 2004 in the 2009 
European Elections, until recently the party’s support seemed to have peaked and been 
limited to European elections because of the proportional system. However, they have seen a 
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recent unprecedented rise in their support, baffling many political commentators and giving 
them seats in both local government and respectable results in parliamentary byelections. 
 
UKIP have been portrayed for many years as little more than a single issue party. Clements, 
Lynch and Whitaker (2013) point to the low salience of the European issue with only around 
6% of people in a 2012 Ipsos/MORI poll saying that the EU or Europe was the biggest issue 
facing Britain. They suggest that the salience may be slightly higher as people link the EU to 
other issues, such as immigration and the economy. However, they believe that UKIP will 
need to do more to raise the profile of this connection, or instead find other issues if they are 
to be more successful (Clements, Lynch & Whitaker, 2013). 
 
 
A recent YouGov poll showed that the economy is very much the most important issue to 
people in the UK, followed by the immigration issue. The Eurocrisis and increased 
immigration from new EU Member States, along with the prospect of further immigration 
from Bulgaria and Romania appear to have made it easier to argue for a link between these 
different issues. 
 
 
(Jordan, YouGov, 8
th
 May 2013) 
 
Where exactly are UKIP in ideological terms though? Some have suggested that whilst UKIP 
policies generally match up well between their candidates and their supporters, a broadening 
of policies brings with it new problems and new disagreements. Whilst there is agreement 
over issues like the EU, things such as the economy may not have the same uniform 
agreement. Lynch, Whitaker and Loomes did a study looking at actual candidates and 
conducted a survey of them. 
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They found that if UKIP are to persuade more eurosceptic Conservative supporters to ‘lend 
their votes’ then they must not only generate an increased salience of the Europe issue, but 
also to have a broader message. One such suggestion is the concept of ‘independence’, in the 
sense that they could focus not just on independence from the EU, but of citizens from 
excessive state intervention, and of UKIP being independent thinkers on issues such as 
Europe, immigration and climate change, being an alternative to what is described as an elite 
consensus. This can then be linked to national and local issues that are of higher importance 
to voters, for example ‘…the costs of membership, the impact of the Working Time Directive 
on the National Health Service and how EU regulations shape local issues from job losses in 
manufacturing to the building of wind farms. (Lynch, Whitaker & Loomes, 2011, p23). 
 
UKIP have also pushed traditional lines on issues such as defence and education, arguing for 
increased spending and the return of grants rather than student loans. They have however 
criticised high spending on foreign aid. Despite the pledges to increase spending on certain 
areas, UKIP have also pledged to introduce a flat tax system and to make billions worth of 
tax and public expenditure cuts. One of the main criticisms of their policies has been ‘where 
will the money come from?’, to which the usual response will be to cut public spending, 
including the money that they claim the UK pays to the European Union (BBC, 2013c). 
 
It is also interesting to compare and contrast support for the more populist UKIP with the 
more extreme British National Party and English Defence League. Ford (2012) looked in 
detail at this particular issue. He found that whilst many voters have concerns over certain 
political issues, such as Islam, immigration and cultural identity, they will distance 
themselves from organisations such as the BNP and EDL as they are seen as being violent, 
racist or having links to fascism. He points out that in fact, ‘The most successful radical right 
politicians are often, paradoxically, those who start by talking about something else’ (Ford, 
2012). 
 
The way UKIP are treated in the media is also an interesting area of study (and one that will 
be addressed in more detail later in this thesis). The British National Party, who had two 
members elected to the European Parliament in 2009, regularly receives negative publicity in 
the press. Their leader, Nick Griffin, made an infamous appearance on the BBC political 
debate show Question Time. There were violent protests outside the television studios over 
the decision to allow him on the programme, and during the programme he was the subject of 
constant criticism from members of the audience and the rest of the panel. This was in fact 
criticised, as this was not the normal way the debate show operated, and led to many 
complaints of unfair treatment. Ford followed up his previous remarks by suggesting why 
Griffin received this treatment, whereas UKIP leader Nigel Farage has appeared on the 
programme several times without any problems. 
 
‘Nigel Farage, by contrast, has been able to raise similar contentious questions about 
immigration, Islam and identity in mainstream political forums such as Question Time 
without being attacked as a racist or a fascist thanks to his roots in a more legitimate 
tradition of Eurosceptic politics.’  (Ford, 2012) 
 
Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2012) did an interesting study of the 2009 European Elections and 
managed to divide UKIP supporters up into two distinct categories - these being ‘strategic’ 
and ‘core’ supporters. They also found that these supporters very often appear to display 
different demographics. 
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One suggestion is that the strategic UKIP supporters tend to be more affluent members of the 
middle class who use second order elections, such as those for the European Parliament, in 
order to demonstrate their dislike of the EU. Their vote is therefore being used as a warning 
to their natural party to change their ways. They found evidence that some Conservatives 
have been making this tactical choice, and that more than half of UKIP’s support in 2009 
came from these ‘strategic defectors’ (Ford, Goodwin & Cutts, 2012, p26). 
 
One of the main assumptions of UKIP supporters is that they are simply disaffected 
Conservative voters, and therefore any votes for UKIP will take away from the Conservative 
vote. Whilst this may be the case to some extent, and is something that will be investigated 
further at a later point, it cannot be assumed that all UKIP voters are former Conservatives, or 
Conservatives who are ‘lending their vote’. 
 
The same research from Ford, Goodwin & Cutts outlined how ‘core’ supporters are very 
much different from their strategic counterparts, both in terms of their views and their 
demographics. In fact, the core supporters that UKIP rely on for both first and second order 
elections tend to be more economically marginalised and politically disaffected. Once again, 
it is suggested that there is an overlap with their profile and that of the extreme right BNP, 
who are also seen to have mobilised ‘economically insecure working class men’. However, 
the BNP are seen as more northern and working class, whereas core supporters of UKIP still 
tend to be more moderate, older, likely to be in the more prosperous south and more likely to 
be women (Ford, Goodwin & Cutts, 2012, p26). 
 
In later work, Ford believes that comparisons can be drawn between UKIP and other populist 
parties in Europe, and acknowledges that their success needs to be put down to more than just 
Conservatives who are angry about the EU. Examples such as the Dutch Party for Freedom, 
Danish People’s Party, Austrian Freedom Party and True Finns are used. 
 
‘Like these parties, UKIP mobilises voters who are primarily concerned about immigration, 
but are also typically nationalist, Eurosceptic and deeply disaffected with the existing 
political elite. In many cases these parties, or their leaders, began on the mainstream right, 
before breaking away to focus on a more populist agenda. (Ford, 2013) 
 
This would make sense, especially with UKIP moving away from simply discussing the EU 
in terms of economic and sovereignty issues, and linking it with other issues, such as 
immigration. 
 
UKIP also struggle in terms of establishing a base of local activists to help them make a 
breakthrough. In this sense they will need more candidates used to what Ford describes as the 
‘hard slog’ of local politics. The example of the Liberal Democrats is used, as they spent a 
number of years establishing local organisations to build their party from the ground up and 
to then translate this into success at a more national level. 
 
Tip O’Neill once observed that “all politics is local”, and under first past the post this is the 
brutal truth: UKIP may carry on rising in the national polls, but without local strongholds 
they will win nothing in a general election. (Ford, 2013) 
 
The well-known journalist Fraser Nelson suggests that UKIP must have adopted a wider 
range of issues because on their own the local elections don’t have anything to do with the 
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European Union. He also suggests they are fast ‘…mutating from an EU protest party into a 
broader party of the working class.’ (Nelson, 2013). 
 
Why then, if the local elections have nothing to do with the European Union, would UKIP be 
so successful in them? Nelson believes that there would be no rational reason for one-in-four 
voters choosing UKIP unless they genuinely believed they had broadened their agenda. This 
is why he feels that the referendum pledge by David Cameron did not ‘shoot the UKIP fox’. 
He admits to believing that UKIP had reached their high water mark, but realises that this has 
since been continuing to rise (Nelson, 2013). 
 
The broader agenda appears to include some of the issues mentioned earlier, and his ability to 
link them in to the UK’s membership of the European Union. Opinion poll ratings published 
in The Observer newspaper show UKIP having a huge surge in support, and this coinciding 
with the local elections in May 2013. This has tailed off in the months since the poll, as the 
economy has shown signs of improving (which has also led to an increase in support for the 
Conservative Party). 
 
 
(Opinium/Observer, 1
st
 June 2013) 
 
 
2.4 - UKIP Voters 
 
The success of UKIP has led many to question what kind of people support them. Kellner 
(2013) highlights the problem that the number of UKIP supporters in most polls is too small 
to provide what we could call a reliable set of data- as is the problem when studying the 
support of many similar populist style parties across Europe. By combining all of the data 
from voting intention surveys over the course of a month, they managed to gain a sample of 
30,000, which included 2700 people who said they would vote for UKIP. This is helpful, as it 
allows us to draw some conclusions from the data without worrying about the sample being 
too small. 
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(Kellner, YouGov, 5
th
 March, 2013) 
 
Kellner’s research suggests that UKIP voters tend to be ‘older and poorer than Tories – but 
LESS right-wing’ (Kellner, 2013). This is interesting, as UKIP as a party are commonly seen 
as being to the right of the Conservative Party. It is also interesting, as despite being normally 
Conservative, the eastern part of Lincolnshire is generally less affluent. 
 
Kellner’s research shows 60% of UKIP’s supporters voted for the Conservative Party in the 
2010 General Election and only 12% actually voted for UKIP. Kellner also states that there is 
nothing new about supporters of the Liberal Democrats, seen as pro-EU, switching to the 
anti-EU UKIP ‘… they are the kind of Lib Dem voters whose choice was driven by a dislike 
for the two big parties rather than enthusiasm for Brussels.’(Kellner, 2013). 
Other analysis from Kellner’s study reveals that 60% of Tories (Conservatives) place 
themselves on the right of the political spectrum, but only 46% of UKIP voter. He also states 
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that 25% of Tories class themselves as being in the centre of left of centre, whereas for UKIP 
the figure is 36%. UKIP supporters are more likely to read right-leaning tabloids, like The 
Mail, The Sun or The Express. 71% of UKIP voters are over 50, only 13% have university 
degrees, and their supporters are less likely than Conservatives to have an above average 
income. 
 
2.5 - The Farage Factor 
 
One important element in terms of UKIP’s success has been the presence of their charismatic 
leader Nigel Farage. Farage first became leader in 2006, and then after standing down for a 
short time during the 2010 General Election became leader again. He is the public face of the 
party and has received huge amounts of media attention, not least for his speeches in the 
European Parliament, where he has also been criticised for insulting various members, 
including the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. In an age where 
many politicians are seen as dull and lacking personality, Farage’s eccentricities and 
charismatic qualities have made him a point of interest in the political arena, and a key part of 
UKIP’s success according to Hayton.  
 
 ‘As one put it, he is a politician they ‘could bear to have a pint with’. In short Farage (like 
Boris Johnson) has cultivated an unconventional image which helps him to get away with 
rather more than the average politician.’ (Hayton, 2013). 
 
Farage, himself a former Conservative, has in the past described himself as being a 
Thatcherite. Some have suggested in the past that some of his views are similar to those of 
the Conservative Party in the 1980s. This led to YouGov conducting a poll for The Sun 
newspaper to see which politician people believed was the most similar to Tory 
(Conservative) grassroots activists. Boris Johnson, the Conservative Mayor of London, came 
second and along with Farage is also seen by the public as being an eccentric and colourful 
character. 
 
(Wilson, The Sun, 21
st
 May, 2013) 
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In a further YouGov poll for the Sunday Times, Nigel Farage was rated the best leader of the 
top four parties. It needs to be kept in mind however, that this survey was asking how good a 
job they felt they were doing with their party. This is easier for leaders of smaller parties if 
they are doing well in the polls than it is for larger parties, like Labour or the Conservatives, 
who have higher expectations placed on them by the public. Half felt he was doing well and 
only one in five thought he was doing badly. ‘When asked who would make a better Prime 
Minister than David Cameron however, Mr Farage fares rather worse: just 11% back the 
UKIP leader, the same number as who back Nick Clegg, while 27% say Ed Miliband would 
be better.’  (Dahlgreen, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
(Dahlgreen, April 26
th
, 2013) 
 
Linda Bos researched the role of the media in terms of the public image that leaders of right-
wing populist parties had. The study was focused on political parties in the Netherlands. She 
found that the public generally arrived at their party choices through the same ideological and 
pragmatic considerations as they would with other parties, but only if these parties were 
perceived as ‘normal’, in that they were democratic and effective (Bos, 2012, pp115-117). 
She also found that the more successful populist leaders were the ones that came across as 
more authoritative, in that what distinguished them was not what made them extraordinary, 
but what made them similar to established party leaders. Whilst the content of media 
coverage affected the public image of political leaders, there were only small differences 
between populist leaders and those who were more established, with the media being able to 
exert both positive and negative effects. Finally, she found that the idiosyncratic style used by 
some populist did not harm them, but did not help them either. 
 
Hopmann et al (2012) studied the news coverage of the 2007 Danish elections to investigate 
whether visibility and tone influenced party choice. They found that the more visible a party 
is and the more positive the tone is towards the party, the more likely people are to vote for 
them. These are however effects of the ‘information environment’, rather than simply effects 
of direct exposure . This can also influence undecided voters (Hopmann et al, 2012, p389). 
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Dr. Simon Usherwood of the University of Surrey believes that more media coverage drives 
more interest and that eventually this means better polling, which again in turn drives more 
coverage. He suggests that parties of limited resources, like UKIP, need to use this as a 
central strategy.  They then ‘piggy back’ on the existing agenda before moving on to create 
their own. Despite their wish to leave the EU, this is why UKIP contest elections to the 
European Parliament as it allows them to ‘frame the debate on Europe’ (Usherwood, 2013). 
 
 
 
2.6 –The National Picture and Results 
 
In the May 2013 Local Elections across England & Wales, UKIP made significant gains and 
were seen very much as the success story of the night. Most of the media coverage regarding 
the elections focused on their successes. The most notable of these was the result in 
Lincolnshire, where they won 16 seats, which resulted in the Conservative council losing 
overall control. 
 
Lincolnshire was not the only place where they enjoyed success though, as they increased 
their number of councillors to 147. When the seats were last contested in 2009 they won no 
seats at all, but they picked up 10 in Hampshire, 9 in Essex, 3 in Gloucestershire, 3 in 
Somerset and 1 in Dorset (Huffington Post, 2013). 
 
One of the main assertions was that UKIP were splitting the Conservative vote and causing 
them serious problems. Leading Conservative politician Ken Clarke described the party as 
“clowns”, to which UKIP leader Nigel Farage responded by saying it was time to "Send in 
the clowns." (Huffington Post, 2013) 
 
This is again mentioned by Dunt (2013), who suggests that unhappy Conservative voters are 
their natural home, with three quarters of their gains coming at a cost to the Conservatives. 
Dunt cites examples such as Gloucestershire and Lincolnshire, where the Tories 
(Conservatives) lost their councils, which went to ‘no overall control’. The Conservatives lost 
18 of their seats in Essex and in Hampshire they ‘…have held on by their fingernails’ (Dunt, 
2013). 
 
Whilst these seats may have been taken from Conservatives, it is necessary to investigate 
whether it is just Conservatives that have been switching their votes to UKIP. However, Dunt 
later acknowledges this and suggests they are also causing a growing problem for Labour and 
what would normally be considered their core supporters. This is linked to earlier points that 
have been made about UKIP, who whilst being respectable have started to prove attractive to 
more working class voters with their focus on issues such as immigration. ‘In wards won by 
the Tories in 2009, Ukip were up 21 at the time of writing. In wards won by Labour in 2009, 
they were up 15. The Ukip effect may be reduced, but it is notable’ (Dunt, 2013). 
 
This ties in with the earlier points made by Ford and Fraser Nelson about UKIP increasingly 
become a party of the disaffected working class. On the same night of the local elections 
there was also a parliamentary byelection for the safe Labour seat of South Shields in the 
North East. UKIP finished in second place with 24.21% of the vote, with the Conservatives 
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coming third. Dunt suggests that UKIP are showing they can appeal to voters outside of their 
traditional strongholds, which he feels Labour leader Ed Miliband has failed to do. 
 
UKIP also had success down south in the Eastleigh byelection in March. Again, whilst they 
didn’t win the seat, their candidate Diane James came second with 27.8% of the vote, behind 
the Liberal Democrats, who held on to the seat with 32%. The Conservatives, who were 
targeting this seat, came third with 25.4%. Labour meanwhile came a distant fourth, despite 
having a celebrity candidate. ‘Ukip saw a remarkable rise in support over just a few weeks of 
campaigning in Eastleigh. It only got four per cent of the Eastleigh vote at the last general 
election.’ (Kirkup & Mason, 2013) 
 
Dunt puts the success of UKIP down to them benefitting from an ‘…anti-politics, anti-
establishment mood, especially with the Liberal Democrats no longer able to hoover up those 
votes’. With the exception of Eastleigh, the decline of the Liberal Democrats is noticeable 
from opinion polls and recent election results since becoming part of the government. Whilst 
ideologically they are nowhere near UKIP, it does beg the question ‘where have their votes 
disappeared to?’. 
 
Like Fraser Nelson, Dunt acknowledges that UKIP have managed to move beyond the focus 
on the EU and have successfully managed to link the Europe issue to immigration and the 
economy, which were seen as more important issues to the public, according the YouGov 
issues tracker that we analysed earlier. They have also been highly effective in capitalising on 
concerns about a potential influx of Bulgarians and Romanians when entrance restrictions are 
lifted in January 2014 (Dunt, 2013). 
 
This could explain why the Conservatives moving to the right has not made a difference to 
their levels of success and why they have also performed well against Labour. Dunt suggests 
that the public rarely see things in terms of ‘right’ or ‘left’. 
 
Finally, we need to consider when looking at the performance of UKIP and other parties 
within the UK system the issue of turnout at elections. A lack of interest in the political 
process or what the main parties have on offer can give smaller parties a better chance of 
success, as Thorpe-Apps points out. This was the case with the extreme British National 
Party in the 2009 European Elections when they gained two MEPs. 
 
‘It is also arguable that UKIP (not extremist, but certainly to the right of the political 
spectrum) only performed as well as they did at the recent local elections due to the low 
turnout.’ (Thorpe-Apps, 2013) 
 
The BNP have won a number of seats at local elections over the years, but have never been 
close to achieving success in a Parliamentary election. Local elections in the United 
Kingdom, as well as European elections, tend to have low turnouts compared to General 
Elections, so would appear to provide more of an opportunity in these cases. 
 
Arzheimer & Carter researched what they called the ‘extreme right vote’ and also found that 
lower turnout rates benefited these parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2003, pp24-25). These 
second order elections also help them to gain experience and to be seen as more legitimate 
players in the political arena. A key point that they also make though, is that these second 
order elections can also be used as a ‘security valve’ for the public to express their 
displeasure with mainstream parties without the need to disturb processes at national level. In 
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this sense they can also disadvantage smaller parties in the long run, as their vote will not 
hold up consistently. They also found that, in common with the observation made by Dunt, 
when the party of the mainstream right moves to the right it tends to legitimise the more 
extreme party than simply channel the demand for its policies. 
 
In common with Thorpe-Apps, it should be pointed out that UKIP are not seen as ‘extremist’. 
What Arheimer & Carter refer to as ‘extreme right parties’ are now more likely to be termed 
populist or radical right. For example they discuss the Austrian Freedom Party, Norwegian 
Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party, all of which would now most likely be referred 
to using different terms. The only example in their study which would still perhaps be termed 
‘extremist’ would be the German NPD. 
 
 
(BBC, 3
rd
 June, 2013) 
 
3.0- Theoretical framework & methodology 
 
It is clear from the previous research and wide scale of opinion, that pinpointing exact 
reasons for the success of populist parties, or indeed any political party is not a simple 
straightforward process. For the purpose of my study I am not looking at the success of UKIP 
across the whole of the country, but instead in a specific area and trying to find out why 
Boston has become a ‘UKIP town’ as Fraser Nelson has described it (Nelson, 2013). Can this 
be put down to coincidence, or are there specific reasons why Boston and Lincolnshire were 
stand out examples at the local elections? 
 
Because I have chosen to look specifically at Boston, I have chosen the case study method for 
this piece of research. This involves research where the crucial elements are not the methods 
of research, but instead the case itself. The interest in the case is therefore the most important 
aspect. This is an approach that Robert Stake is best known for, as opposed to other 
researchers such as Robert Yin who ‘…place more emphasis on the method and the 
techniques that constitute a case study.' (Johansson, 2003, p2). 
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(Johansson, 2003, p10) 
 
I will be using a deductive approach using hypotheses gained from previous research that can 
be tested against the case of Boston, and whether or not this place appears to be an exception. 
Robert Stake describes case studies as featuring descriptions that are complex, holistic and 
containing a ‘…a myriad of not highly isolated variables;. Data that are likely to be gathered 
at least partly by personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps 
narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, illustration, and even allusion and metaphor’ 
(Stake, 1978, p7). Stake also suggests that an comparisons made are implicit rather than 
explicit, and that whilst themes and hypotheses are important, they are subordinate to the 
general understanding of the case. 
 
I intend to use various different approaches and forms of data to investigate UKIP’s success 
in Boston, and will be using these different approaches to see whether or not they come to 
similar conclusions and validate each other’s findings. I am therefore hoping that 
triangulation will help to validate my findings by helping to analyse from multiple 
perspectives. This will involve the use of census data, opinions polls media reports, and 
interviews amongst other forms of relevant documentation for research. Guion, Diehl & 
McDonald (2011) have highlighted the work of Patton in using the triangulation method, 
whereby there is a common misconception that the goal of this method of research is to arrive 
at consistency across data and approaches. For them, the inconsistencies that are likely to be 
arrived at can actually uncover deeper meaning in the data, and therefore should not be seen 
as weakening any evidence. 
 
Bearing this in mind, it may be that triangulation results in more questions than answers. This 
is not necessarily a bad thing however, if it leads to a deeper understanding of the area of 
study. In terms of actual methods, Guion, Diehl & McDonald describe triangulation also 
involving the use of multiple qualitative and/or quantitative methods of study. These can 
involve surveys, focus groups and interviews, which can then in turn be compared to see if 
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there are any similar results. If there are any similar conclusions from the results then this can 
establish some validity. 
 
 
3.1 - Ethics and Bias 
 
Methods are not the only consideration for my work however, and it will also be important to 
consider questions of ethics and of bias. Marshall & Rossman define ethical research as being 
grounded in moral principles, such as respect for people, beneficence and justice. We should 
not be using those participating in our studies as a means to an end (which may be our own), 
and we should also be respecting things such as their privacy, anonymity and their right to 
participate or not participate. We should therefore have their free consent (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011, p47). 
 
This is especially relevant to me, as the work I am doing is likely to be politically sensitive. 
In the past I have been, and still am, highly active in local politics. Bearing this in mind it is 
therefore important to make sure I do not use my research in a way that would be detrimental 
to those that I have interviewed or gained information from. As part of my current political 
involvement, I am not purposefully allowed to be in contact with local Conservative Party 
members, and as a former elected member (in another authority) I am unlikely to be able to 
interview those from other parties without me being dishonest about who I am. There is also 
the prospect that even though I promise elected members anonymity and confidentiality, the 
fact I have gained an insight from them could benefit me in the future. With this in mind, I 
have decided that I will be relying on secondary sources and interviews or sound bites from 
politicians that have already been conducted by others, mainly the media. This removes some 
of the ethical obstacles. It should not prevent me from conducting interviews with experts or 
anonymous surveys with members of the public. 
 
Marshall & Rossman suggest a guide for researchers to try to understand any use of bias that 
they may include in the research. This is to help with ‘…assumptions, any prior observations 
or associations that might influence the research, and any personal connections and histories 
that could be useful or, conversely, could be seen as harmful bias.’ (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011, p97). Whilst I am aiming not to be biased in my research, I am aware that my 
association with a political party and my own experiences will have an influence on the way I 
view information. 
 
 
3.2 - Hypotheses and Testing 
 
Having extensively discussed previous research and theories on both the success of UKIP and 
of other populist parties in Europe, there are a number of theories that have emerged that 
could be tested. However, there are three main areas that I have identified that I think would 
be appropriate for this study in the Boston area. These three areas are those of: election 
turnout; immigration; and UKIP’s media presence. 
 
With turnouts being historically low for second order elections in the UK, especially local 
council elections, I would like to test the theory of Arzheimer & Carter (2003) that right-wing 
parties, such as UKIP have benefitted from a low turnout. To do this I will be looking at 
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election results from the local council elections, but also at those from the European and 
Parliamentary elections to test whether the turnout in Boston and surrounding areas may have 
been a factor. Thorpe-Apps (2013) suggested that a lack of interest in what the main parties 
have on offer may also help UKIP, and that this in turn also has an effect on turnout. Analysis 
of previous elections may also prove or disprove whether second order elections are the 
‘security valve’ for the public to express their unhappiness with mainstream parties without 
affecting processes at a national level (Arzheimer & Carter, 2003). Simply identifying 
whether the turnout is low or not will not give us the full picture though, and a further 
analysis of reasons why the turnout may have been low would give further perspective. Were 
turnouts only affected for certain parties? 
 
To test Arzheimer & Carter’s theory, I not only intend to analyse election results at various 
levels, but also to see what politicians felt were the main issues surrounding the election. I 
will look at their views both before and after the election, and hope that this will perhaps help 
to explain any issues surrounding turnout and the election in general. This may also result in 
other factors being identified. I will use interviews already conducted in the local media to 
obtain these views, mainly for the ethical and practical reasons outlined earlier. The 
hypothesis will be tested in the ‘political’ section of this thesis. 
 
The second hypothesis that I wish to test concerns immigration. With immigration being an 
issue that has brought Boston to the attention of the national media, and having experienced a 
large amount of immigration in a relatively short period of time, it would make sense to test 
this considering the extensive research that has already been conducted on this variable 
across other countries in Europe. In particular I am interested in the work of Halla, Wagner & 
Zweimuller (2012) in Austria, where they found that when an immigrant population in an 
area increased, so did votes for the populist FPÖ. This is too simplistic on its own however, 
and it is their further assertion that the skills composition of migrants, especially those with 
low or medium skill levels, increased support for the party that interests me. This is 
particularly relevant for studying Boston, as there are a large number of unskilled workers in 
industries such as agriculture. 
 
I would also like this hypothesis to be tested alongside the theory put forward by Warmenbol 
(2007), who studied support for the Vlaams Belang in Belgium. This theory suggested that 
areas surrounding those with high levels of immigration could also be susceptible to voting 
for populist parties. This ‘inkblot’ theory suggests that areas that do not have, or have only 
recently had, immigration are liable to vote this way as they seek to prevent their own area 
from having the same problems as those neighbouring them. This ‘threat hypothesis’ can 
easily be tested alongside Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller’s theory as I will be able to simply 
look at election results from Boston’s neighbouring areas. What I will be testing therefore, is 
whether the low skills composition of migrants has had an effect (Halla, Wagner & 
Zweimuller), and whether this has then had an inkblot effect on surrounding areas 
(Warmenbol). 
 
To test this hypothesis I intend to use data from the 2011 Census, Lincolnshire Research 
Observatory (2011) and Boston Borough Council’s report on the Social Impact of Population 
Change (2012). Other research has highlighted issues such as poverty and unemployment 
(O’Connell 2005, Golder 2003) or cultural factors (Oesch 2008, Goodwin 2011) that may not 
influence, or in some cases may influence support for populist parties. However, these are not 
being explicitly tested in this study. The hypotheses will be tested in my ‘demographics’ 
section of the thesis. 
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The third and final hypothesis that I wish to test regards the media presence of UKIP. 
Usherwood (2013) has suggested that more media coverage leads to better polling, which in 
turn leads to more coverage. He has also suggested that UKIP therefore ‘piggy back’ on 
existing agendas so they can later push their own. In the Danish case, Hopmann et al (2012) 
has found that the more visible a party is during elections and the more positive the tone is 
towards them, the more likely people are to vote for them, including those voters who are 
undecided. This is due to the ‘information environment’, rather than direct exposure however. 
Linda Bos (2012) found that the more successful populist leaders were the ones that came 
across as more ‘authoritative’, in that they were distinguished not by being extraordinary, but 
by being similar to established party leaders. 
 
Incorporating Hopmann’s work, the hypothesis that I wish to test then is whether or not the 
amount of media coverage received by UKIP and the tone of it has had a positive effect on 
their election results. This will also involve analysis of their leader, Nigel Farage, to see 
whether the theory of Linda Bos (2012) can also be applied. To test this hypothesis I will not 
be conducting an exhaustive scientific study of all press articles related to UKIP, as this is 
beyond the scale of this thesis. I will however be using various articles from the local and 
national media, including some of those highlighted in a section looking at the media 
representation of Boston as a town in Boston Borough Council’s report on the Social Impact 
of Population Change (2012). To further validate my testing of the hypothesis I have secured 
an interview with an expert on media politics from a local university. This will be the ‘media 
presence’ section of the thesis. 
 
I will conclude my study by summarising whether or not each of the hypotheses can be 
supported or not in each of the sections and whether there appear to be any other explanatory 
factors that have emerged from the research. The aim will then be to try and explain why 
UKIP were successful in the local elections in Boston. 
 
 
4.0 – Political section 
 
This section will now look at whether any electoral factors could be responsible for the 
results gained by UKIP, and specifically whether the hypothesis of Arzheimer & Carter on 
low turnouts benefiting right-wing populist parties can be supported. Boston is controlled on 
several different levels politically, so I will detail these in this section. 
 
The town of Boston is governed by Boston Borough Council, which is currently controlled 
by the Conservatives since it last held elections in 2011. The next tier of government that 
Boston is controlled by is Lincolnshire County Council, which includes the area controlled by 
Boston Borough Council and various other districts. It is the 2013 Lincolnshire County 
Council elections where UKIP have made the breakthrough, and that are the main focus of 
this thesis. The UK Parliamentary constituency within which Boston is included is that of 
Boston & Skegness, created in 1997 and represented by the Conservative Mark Simmonds 
MP since 2001. It is seen as a relatively ‘safe’ Conservative seat in electoral terms. The 
Skegness part of the constituency is in the neighbouring district of East Lindsey. Boston is 
included within the East Midlands region for European Elections, and currently the East 
Midlands has five MEPs (2 UKIP – after a defection from a Conservative MEP, 1 
Conservative, 1 Labour, 1 Liberal Democrat). 
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4.1 – Lincolnshire County Council Results 
 
Lincolnshire County Council has traditionally been a Conservative controlled council, apart 
from the odd occasion where no one party has had a majority and the Council has been under 
no overall control (NOC). Below is a history of the control of Lincolnshire County Council. 
 
 
(BBC, 3
rd
 June, 2013)  
 
In May 2013, the whole of the Council was up for election. The leaders and main people 
from each of the parties in the Boston area gave their views to the local newspaper, The 
Boston Standard, on what they felt the issues in the election would be. Six of the seven 
council wards were controlled by Conservatives, with the remaining ward being held by an 
independent. 
 
Conservative councillor Peter Bedford, who is also the leader of Boston Borough Council 
was hoping for a ‘clean sweep’ of seats in Boston. He believed that it was difficult to defeat a 
sitting councillor if they had done their work properly, and thought that his team had worked 
hard enough to win re-election, not just in Boston, but in Lincolnshire as a whole. He felt that 
the two key issues in the area were immigration and the poor state of the county’s roads. 
Despite UKIP fielding candidates in every seat, she said he felt voting for UKIP would be a 
wasted vote and that it would simply mean an increased chance of a Labour victory (Brookes, 
2013). 
 
Labour’s Paul Kenny, who was standing for the County Council, but is also a Borough 
councillor chose to focus on welfare. This appeared more of a criticism of national 
government, where he believed the Conservatives were penalising people, and that this was 
making people in Boston angry (Brookes, 2013). 
 
UKIP’s Don Ransome, who was standing along with several other members of his family in 
Boston, where his party had a full slate of seven candidates said he hoped to win at least one 
of the contests there. He felt that there had been a positive swing for UKIP in terms of 
people’s moods towards them, and that they had never been as popular as they were at the 
current moment in time. He felt this showed that they are more than just a protest vote. 
 
He added: “We have got an enormous range of policies. We are not talking about the EU at 
these elections, we are talking about wheelie bins, potholes and street lights because those 
are some of the critical issues for our county councillors.” (Brookes, 2013). This would echo 
the earlier points made by Nelson (2013) about UKIP broadening their agenda. 
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(Lincolnshire County Council, 2013) 
 
The Lincolnshire Echo, a paper with a circulation across the entire county gave their 
predictions for the result, following them conducting a poll. They predicted that UKIP would 
be the biggest gainers in the County Council elections. 
 
 
 
(Williams, M., 2013) 
 
Their predictions from the survey suggested that the Conservatives, led locally by Martin 
Hill, would still control the county with 32% of the vote. ‘That would be 16 per cent down on 
the party's share of the overall vote at the 2009 election’. (Williams, M., 2013). They did not 
suggest a reason for this however. 
 
In fact, the Conservatives scored slightly 
higher than predicted, achieving 35.9%. 
However, UKIP also increased their share 
of the votes to 24.2%, again this is more 
than predicted. The biggest hit appears to 
have been taken by the Liberal Democrats 
and Independent candidates. However, 
simply looking at the share of votes does 
not give an accurate representation or 
explanation of results, especially not in a 
first-past-the-post system. Issues such as 
turnout are far more telling, which is what 
we are looking for. As we can see from the 
graphs, the share of votes does not 
automatically convert into the number of seats 
won. The graphs also show which party won 
in various wards in Lincolnshire, and has a 
breakdown of the town of Boston. 
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(Lincolnshire County Council, 2013) 
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As we can see, the Conservatives are still considerably the biggest party in Lincolnshire, but 
there is a large concentration of purple (UKIP) in the east of the county. This is primarily in 
Boston, but also in the East Lindsey district, mostly in the area that includes the Boston & 
Skegness Parliamentary constituency. If the results were replicated at a General Election then 
UKIP would have their first Member of Parliament. However, this is unlikely due to the 
increased turnout for General Elections and the increased competition from other parties for 
votes, such as Labour and the Liberal Democrats (who were absent in the County Council 
elections in Boston). There is also the prospect of UKIP losing the ‘strategic voters’ that 
Ford, Goodwin & Cutts (2012) discussed earlier. What the electoral map of Lincolnshire also 
shows is that the areas immediately surrounding Boston also elected UKIP councillors. This 
would be consistent with Warmenbol’s ‘ink-blot’ theory where districts that do not have, or 
have only recently had immigration are prone to voting for populist parties when they see 
their area as being under threat (Warmenbol, 2007). This will be explored later in the 
demographics section. 
 
The full results from Boston, including the candidates, the number of votes cast and the 
turnouts are included in Appendix (i) (Lincolnshire County Council, 2013). UKIP won five 
of the seven County Council wards in Boston, with the other two being won by a 
Conservative in Boston Rural (who gained from an independent) and an independent (who 
gained from a Conservative) in Boston South. The main thing that is noticeable from the 
results is the significant drop in what was already a low turnout from the previous election in 
2009. The lowest drop was 1.4% (from 34.4% to 33%) in Boston South, with the highest drop 
being 7.6% in Boston Rural. There was a drop in turnout for every single ward, which would 
support Arzheimer & Carter’s hypothesis that a low turnout has benefitted the populist party, 
in this case UKIP. With the exception of Boston Rural, which the Conservatives won, they 
experienced a sharp drop in votes for every single ward. Aside from Boston Rural and the 
closely contested Boston South, UKIP won all five of the others seats, all with significantly 
reduced Conservative votes and low turnouts. 
 
In 2009 there were candidates from the Boston Bypass Independents and the British National 
Party. These were both absent from the elections on this occasion, and despite them being a 
party of government there were no Liberal Democrat candidates in any of the wards. Dunt 
(2013) has already identified that the Liberal Democrats are no longer able to ‘hoover up’ the 
anti-establishment vote now because they are part of the government, and in the case of 
Boston their lack of presence begs the question ‘who did their votes go to?’. They certainly 
did not go to the Conservatives, so it appears that UKIP are the only possible beneficiaries. In 
this sense, the lack of political competition and choice appears to have contributed to UKIP’s 
success. The Conservatives’ main natural competitor, The Labour Party, appears to have a 
weak presence in the area, as we will also see in the next section. There also appears to have 
been a distinct lack of interest in the established parties, which Thorpe-Apps (2013) has 
suggested has a negative effect on turnout. 
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4.2 – Boston Borough Council 
 
It is also worth looking at other elections in Boston to try and gain some extra perspective on 
the town. Elections for Boston Borough Council in 2011 also show that there is a general lack 
of competition in terms of mainstream political parties. There is also a strong independent 
streak. (Boston Borough Council, 2011). Out of the 18 different wards, Labour only managed 
to stand candidates in 8 of these, and the Liberal Democrats in only 3. With the exception of 
Frampton & Holme, where there was only an Independent, UKIP and BBI candidate, the 
Conservatives had candidates in every ward, although in some cases did not stand more than 
one candidate in a ward when there was more than one seat up for grabs. It can sometimes be 
difficult to find a full slate of candidates, but the lack of mainstream opposition to the 
Conservatives is unusual. There are also a number of candidates for the English nationalist 
group the English Democrats, including a former BNP councillor for the Fenside ward. 
 
Between 2007-2011 the Borough Council was run by BBI, the Boston Bypass Independents, 
who campaigned on traffic issues and for a bypass to be built for Boston. They had a shock 
victory over what had previously been a joint administration between the Conservatives, 
Liberal Democrats and Labour. They were however dissolved in 2011, and the council 
returned to Conservative control, with the leader of the Conservatives dismissing the BBI and 
suggesting that they had ‘…subjected Boston to "four years of nonsense" and it was now 
"time for a change" pledging a "more democratic and transparent council." (Lincolnshire 
Echo, 2011). 
 
Once again, the general apathy and low turnout of these elections, where in many cases 
parties have not had a full slate of candidates, could contribute to smaller parties having an 
opportunity for a breakthrough. The fact that the BNP, English Democrats and the Boston 
Bypass Independents now appear to have disappeared off the radar also suggests that 
Arzheimer & Carter’s point about second order elections being used by a ‘security valve’ 
appears to be apparent. Whilst allowing smaller parties to enjoy some success, it also 
prevents them from sustaining their vote it comes to national elections, making consistent 
performances difficult and therefore not allowing them to properly establish themselves. 
 
The absence of mainstream opposition could explain why UKIP did better in Boston than 
they did in other parts of Lincolnshire in the county council elections. A look at the political 
map of Lincolnshire shows that most of UKIP’s successes were in the east of the county, and 
away from the towns of Lincoln, Grantham and Louth, where there is a stronger Labour Party 
presence. 
 
 
4.3 -What the politicians said 
 
We have seen what politicians thought before the elections, but how did local politicians 
explain the result of the Lincolnshire County Council elections of 2013 though? Rowena 
Mason from The Telegraph went to Boston after the election to interview various political 
leaders and to try and find out what happened and why. This is useful for me as I have not 
been able to conduct these interviews myself because of restrictions placed on me and for 
ethical reasons. Mason begins by discussing a supermarket worker who was shocked at his 
33 
 
election as a UKIP councillor. She then states that both sides agreed the cause of the shock 
results was not just unhappiness with Prime Minister David Cameron, but with the entire 
‘political class’ and that they had ignored the concerns of a rural area that was struggling to 
cope with mass immigration (Mason, 2013). 
 
Martin Hill, the Conservative Leader of the County Council said after the elections that 
people felt there was a political elite that were divorced from the realities faced by ordinary 
people. He felt that the party nationally had a lack of communicators that could connect with 
people the way Margaret Thatcher could. He felt that people on the doorstep felt 
disconnected, even if they agreed with local policies. This is why many Conservatives stayed 
at home. One of his main criticisms was of ministers repeating an earlier claim by the Prime 
Minister that UKIP were a party of ‘fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists’. He felt that this 
insulted UKIP voters, including some ex-Conservatives “That was really shooting ourselves 
in the foot.”  (Mason, 2013) 
 
Eddy Poll, the Conservative Deputy Leader of the Council (who lost his seat in Spalding 
East) said that the party had campaigned incredibly hard, but that the turnout was dismally 
poor. “Last time, I got 1,600 votes, this time I got 800. Those people didn’t go to Ukip. I think 
there were a lot of disaffected Conservative voters who stayed at home and didn’t vote at 
all.” (Mason, 2013). He also felt that whilst immigration was causing social change, much of 
this happened under Tony Blair, and that it is unfair to blame the Conservatives for the 
situation they have inherited. Again, this backs up Arzheimer & Carter’s hypothesis. 
 
Peter Bedford, the Conservative Leader of the Borough Council (who lost his County Council 
seat Boston Coastal) said: "It was a protest against central government's policies - it's 
disappointing but we'll bounce back." (BBC, 2013b) 
 
A number of members of the same family, the Ransomes, were elected as councillors for 
UKIP in Boston. Sue Ransome admitted that she had not done a great deal of canvassing in 
her area. Two of Mrs Ransome’s daughters were also elected to the council. They had 
previously tried to stand as candidates, but had never been close to getting elected. Mrs 
Ransome was formerly a socialist and a liberal, whereas her husband was a former 
Conservative. It was hearing Nigel Farage on the radio that convinced her UKIP were the 
right party for her. She believes that Farage’s growing media profile and his visits to 
Lincolnshire, where he addressed issues such as immigration, fishing and wind turbines 
helped contribute to their success in the area. “He’s a great vote winner no doubt about 
that,” she said. “He was a sell-out in Boston, people couldn’t get in.”  (Mason, 2013). Mr 
Farage’s ability to link these issues to the European Union has been very effective, as Lynch, 
Whitaker & Loomes (2011) have suggested. This would also suggest that Mr Farage has 
managed to come across as ‘authoritative’ on the issues as a mainstream politician would, 
therefore becoming more successful according to Linda Bos (2012), which we will again test 
later in the media section. 
 
Conservative Councillor Mike Gilbert, the portfolio holder for community development at 
Boston Borough Council, who lost his seat in Boston East felt that the swing to UKIP was a 
result of the public "…expressing frustration to politicians at national level and beyond about 
the undue influence of the European Union.” (Truslove, 2013) 
 
UKIP’s Chris Pain, elected for the Wainfleet & Burgh ward in East Lindsey, which borders 
Boston and is part of the Boston & Skegness Parliamentary constituency, was unhappy at 
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suggestions that migrants in the area could now face persecution. He said that the only people 
being persecuted were the people who have lived in Boston for years. "They've realised that 
they have woken up and local society has changed beyond all recognition. They are saying 
'enough is enough'. They are not happy about it." (Truslove, 2013). 
 
As Mason suggested at the start, there seemed almost uniform agreement between politicians 
that the ‘political class’ and the public’s unhappiness with them was the reason for the shock 
result. Eddy Poll’s remarks again illustrate how low turnout has been a major part of the 
election results, once more in line with Arzheimer & Carter’s hypothesis. What the remarks 
of local politicians could explain however, are the reasons why the Conservative vote 
dropped so significantly. 
 
 
5.0 – Demographic section  
 
In this section the demographics of Lincolnshire and the Boston area will be examined, using 
the 2011 Census as our main source of data. We then examine Boston Borough Council’s 
report on the social impact of migration and take a look at the skill levels and types of work 
that migrants have been involved with. This is in order to test the hypotheses from Halla, 
Wagner & Zweimuller (2012) and Warmenbol (2007) to see whether increased immigration, 
and in particular low or medium skilled immigration, could have contributed to increased 
support for UKIP, and whether this has then had an ‘ink-blot’ effect on surrounding areas. 
 
 
5.1 – Boston and Lincolnshire 
 
Research Lincolnshire analysed the 2011 Census for which there were three main areas they 
highlighted (Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2011). The first of which was that 
Lincolnshire continued to have a lower skilled population, and despite large improvements 
had a higher proportion of residents with no qualifications to the national average. There are 
also a lower proportion of people employed in professional and technical occupations. 
 
The second area was that there was significant population change, but Lincolnshire remained 
less ‘diverse’ than other areas of the UK. In ethnicity terms, the non-white population went 
up to 2.4%, compared to 1.4% in 2001. This is compared to a national non-white population 
of 14%. Lincolnshire has a higher proportion of residents born in the EU than the rest of the 
country, with most immigration coming from the within the European Union. 
 
The third area highlighted by Research Lincolnshire has been that Lincolnshire continues to 
show an older demographic. Single person households aged over 65 made up 14% of 
households, whereas this was 12% nationally. The number of people having their day to day 
activities limited by their health was 20% compared to 18% nationally. 
 
This is interesting, as it suggests that the county could be fertile ground for UKIP with its 
lower-skilled, less diverse and slightly older demographic, which was found by Kellner 
(2013) in his earlier survey results. However, Lincolnshire is a huge county, and it would be 
wrong to make assumptions for the whole area based on an average. From the previous 
section we have also seen that UKIP votes have tended to be isolated to the east of the 
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county, so this is of more interest to us, as is the specific demographics of the town of 
Boston, as this is main case we are studying. 
 
The Census’s demographic information about Boston’s population has shown a 15.9% 
increase in population between 2001 and 2011. This is 50% higher than the county and 
double the rate nationally. Those over 65 years of age have increased by 26,000 in the entire 
county (21%), but in Boston this has been around 1855 people (20%). It has also seen a large 
increase in population for people in their 20’s (Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2011). 
 
Truslove outlines some basic facts about Boston related to migration: 
 Boston's population grew from 55,751 in 2001 to 64,637 in 2011 
 In 2011, 54,847 people living in the town were born in the UK compared to 54,023 in 2001 
 In 2001 there were 500 people from Western Europe and 134 from Eastern Europe 
 By contrast, in 2011 there were 7,865 people from EU countries 
 While the UK-born population of Boston dropped overall from 2001 to 2011, the number of 
English-born residents increased by 1,997 (Truslove, 2013) 
 
 
One major issue has been the perception that the number of migrants in the area is actually 
far higher than those recorded in the 2011 Census. This was one of the issues raised with the 
task & finish panel at Boston Borough Council during their study of the impact of migration 
in the town. Those who have suggested the population figure is higher than has been stated 
have used patient registration data and national insurance number issues to support their 
claims. They have also suggested that some migrants may have been deterred from 
completing census forms by their landlords (Boston Borough Council, 2012, p1). The fact 
that so much of the immigration to Boston has been relatively recent could also support some 
of Warmenbol’s arguments. 
 
Professor Gary Craig from the University of Hull was interviewed by the Task & Finish 
Panel and contributed many suggestions as to why the area had seen such a large increase of 
migrants in the area and why they occupied certain places within the employment market. He 
highlighted the need for labour leading to a higher concentration of gangmasters than the rest 
of the country. Eastern Europeans had been attracted to the area in search of better lives, but 
he believed for some it had turned into a nightmare and become a modern form of slavery. He 
did acknowledge that most gangmasters were legal and operated properly however. Whilst 
the rates of pay were better than Eastern Europe, in many cases they are below the minimum 
wage and the conditions are poor, Because of this, local people do not want these jobs. 
Therefore he asserts that the idea they are ‘taking our jobs’ is simply not true. Employers are 
impressed by migrants’ work ethic, and if they were to leave there would be nobody to do 
these jobs. For Professor Craig, the issue is surrounded by ‘myth and prejudice’ (Boston 
Borough Council, 2012, p38). 
 
This perspective helps to explain why there has been such a recent influx of migrants to the 
area. It also gives us a good insight into the kind of jobs that migrants are doing, and the skill 
set that they are arriving with. The point about the jobs not being filled by local people could 
also suggest that far from ‘taking our jobs’ the conflict could be cultural rather than 
economic. However, regardless of whether the conflict is cultural or economic, this does 
support Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller’s hypothesis about a lower skilled set of migrants 
leading to an increase in the populist vote. Issues with the labour market earlier mentioned in 
the census have similarities to the work done by Sadka & Razin (1995), and whilst Docquier 
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et al (2010) and Hansen et al (2010) have suggested that migration does not lower wages, the 
fact that some have been working for less than minimum wage suggests this may be the case, 
despite the fact that locals may not want the work on offer anyway. 
 
Of course, Boston was not the only area where UKIP enjoyed successes, as we saw in the 
previous section. Skegness in the East Lindsey area is also included as part of the 
Parliamentary constituency Boston & Skegness. This is mainly a holiday coastal area and 
also includes a large agricultural sector. The constituency is also listed as having a relatively 
low level of academic qualifications compared to the national average. Boston is recorded in 
the 2011 Census as having 32.70% of those aged 16 and above having no educational 
qualifications, as opposed to Lincolnshire having 26.10% and the average for England & 
Wales being 22.70% (Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2011). The amount of agricultural 
jobs could also explain why there is concern about Romania and Bulgarian workers coming 
in January 2014, as both countries have a large number of people employed in those sectors 
and it would be fair to assume that the Boston and East Lindsey area could therefore be likely 
to have an influx of workers. Dunt (2013) has argued that UKIP have been successful in 
capitalising on this issue. Once again, Warmenbol’s ink-blot theory appears relevant. 
 
Pidd, from the left-leaning Guardian newspaper visited Boston, reporting that they had the 
most Eastern European migrants as recorded in the Census. Referring to Boston as a ‘farming 
town’, she interviewed residents who were unhappy at the change the town had seen since the 
enlargement of the European Union in 2004. Unlike other countries, the UK chose to remove 
the temporary restrictions on the movement of labour from these countries, leading to a 
significant number of workers entering the labour market, which was subsequently far higher 
than expected. ‘10.6% of the town's 64,600-strong population comes from one of the "new" 
EU countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Romania.’ (Pidd, 2012) 
 
Pidd also notes that the influx of workers has also had an effect on other local services in the 
area, giving the specific example of one of the local primary schools where 62% of the pupils 
are from migrant backgrounds. Despite being positive about the efforts of the school, its 
recent Ofsted report noted that almost all on arrival were at an early stage of learning English. 
The parking sign outside the school is also translated into five languages (Pidd, 2012). 
 
Coastal towns in the UK have been known to be high on the list of deprived areas, and this is 
consistently the case with statistics, both from Census information and from other studies 
conducted by the Office for National Statistics. Looking at these statistics on a map shows a 
harsh contrast in the county of Lincolnshire, showing again that using county averages for 
statistical purposes are not necessarily the best way to proceed in our research. The western 
part of Lincolnshire is generally ranked as one of the least deprived areas in the country, 
whereas the east side is ranked as one of the most deprived. This appears to particularly affect 
the Boston area and the adjoining parts of East Lindsey. The map showing the 2010 Index of 
Multiple Deprivation appears to also show that the most deprived areas are very similar to the 
political map of Lincolnshire in terms of areas where UKIP enjoyed success. 
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(Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2011b, p4) 
 
Finally, an interesting piece of research from the IPPR think-tank, published in The 
Economist, showed the levels of White Britons who identified themselves as ‘English’, rather 
than ‘British’. They also found that people who consider themselves English rather than 
British usually tend to be more hostile to immigration and likely to vote for right-wing parties 
like UKIP. Conversely, ‘For some, the flag of St George is too closely associated with far-
right groups such as the English Defence League. (The Economist, May 25
th
, 2013). 
 
The intriguing thing about this research is that many of the areas where the largest proportion 
of people identified themselves as ‘English’ were in almost identical areas to some of the 
high indices of deprivation and also in areas where UKIP have enjoyed some success. In the 
case of Lincolnshire and Boston, the graphs appear to match up almost perfectly. 
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(The Economist, May 25
th
, 2013) 
 
From analysing the demographic data of Boston and Lincolnshire then, there has been a high 
level of low unskilled immigration, and from the graphs we have seen, both here and in the 
previous political section, we can see that the UKIP vote is also noticeable in the surrounding 
deprived areas. Therefore, there is evidence to support the hypotheses put forward by Halla, 
Wagner & Zweimuller and also Warmenbol. 
 
 
6.0 – Media presence section 
 
The final research section concerns the local and national media’s portrayals of UKIP and of 
Boston, including the visibility and tone of both (Hopmann et al, 2012). As has been 
discussed earlier, this is not an exhaustive study of all of the media coverage of the town, and 
is instead intended to give a general picture. It includes the thoughts of the task & finish panel 
that produced the report on the Social Impact of Population Change in Boston and also 
examples of some of the more well-known recent articles about the town. It also contains 
information on the visit of Nigel Farage, and begins with an interview of a leading local 
academic. 
 
 
6.1 – Interview with Dr. Matthew Ashton 
 
I was fortunate enough to obtain an interview with Dr. Matthew Ashton, an expert on media 
politics, from Nottingham Trent University. The purpose of this interview was to gain a better 
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understanding of the media’s role in the success of UKIP and the importance of Nigel Farage 
to their image. This is mainly related to the national picture rather than Boston specifically, 
although this is touched on towards the end. The full interview is included in the appendix 
(ii), but here I now produce a summary of his main points. 
 
The first question I asked Dr. Ashton was what role does he feel the media had in the success 
of UKIP nationally. Ashton mentions Duverger’s Law and the difficulty of minor parties in 
making any sort of impact in Britain’s 2 or 2.5 party system. UKIP have managed to break 
this circle for a number of reasons. These being: 1) holding views that the owners of some 
large media companies agree with, such as euroscepticism; 2) having a charismatic front man 
in Farage, whom he likens to Boris Johnson; 3) the media thriving on novelty and UKIP 
offering something a bit new; 4) the media thriving on bad news and conflict, with UKIP 
causing some conflict within the Conservative Party; 5) UKIP having a lot of maverick 
politicians, increasing the chance of scandals or gaffes which may sell more newspapers. 
 
In terms of Hopmann et al’s hypothesis on visibility and tone, the party has certainly 
managed to increase the first aspect and appear to be receiving more a positive tone from the 
media according to Dr. Ashton’s observations. Dr. Ashton also suggested that UKIP have 
received a hugely disproportionate amount of coverage. For example, the Green Party has a 
Member of Parliament, but doesn’t get anywhere near as much coverage. He doubts however 
that they will be able to keep their momentum up from the European Elections if they do not 
win any seats at the next General Election. Zoe Williams from The Guardian has also made 
this point about the Green Party, in that if you were to show people a picture of their leader 
Natalie Bennett and one of Nigel Farage then it is clear that Farage would be the one they 
recognise ‘…not because he has more support. It is because he is on telly more often’ 
(Williams, Z, 2013). 
 
In terms of his views on Farage, Ashton feels that he tends to dominate UKIP stories. This is 
fine on single issues, but the party needs more big figures if it is to be seen as a serious party 
of government. The party did well in the Eastleigh by-election, but almost all of the publicity 
was focused on Farage rather than their candidate. As has been earlier mentioned, Ashton 
also points out Farage’s success in linking the issues of the economy and immigration to the 
EU. Like Usherwood (2013) has suggested, he has successfully ‘piggy backed’ on this issue, 
and as he is discussing a mainstream political issue, he has been able to appear more 
‘authoritative’, as Linda Bos (2012) discussed. For Ashton. Farage has managed to highlight 
issues where mainstream politicians have used poor economic or immigration data and has 
seized on this effectively. 
 
In terms of the immigration issue, Ashton believes that they have managed to frame the issue 
around the EU, so far avoiding any questions of race, although they will not be able to do this 
forever. Unlike the BNP, they have been able to approach this issue and appear on television 
programmes such as Question Time regularly due to being on the right side political 
perception. As Ford (2012) has suggested, this is due to their roots in more respectable 
eurosceptic politics, rather than the fascist roots of the BNP. 
 
Finally, Dr. Ashton believes that the most important reasons for UKIP’s success in the local 
elections were the EU and the financial crisis. In local terms, he suggests that in some areas 
with high immigration the economic situation may be better, or the other main parties may 
have stronger roots. These later points are similar to some of the results from the ‘political’ 
section of this thesis, where UKIP were successful in the less affluent east of Lincolnshire. 
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6.2 - Boston in the Media 
 
Focusing more specifically on the town of Boston, the local council’s report on population 
change pointed out that whilst the town regularly makes the news, the news is not always 
positive, and the editorial slant given to this influences how people think and behave. They 
stress that therefore the press have a social responsibility, especially when sensitive issues 
such as immigration are being discussed (Boston Borough Council, 2012). 
 
Boston Borough Council invited members of the local press to contribute to the report by 
answering questions about the presentation of local news issues. The questioning involved 
asking why there are so many reports about foreigners committing crimes. The local press 
stressed that on issues such as crime, they only tend to attend the court on a certain day, and 
simply report the cases listed, rather than targeting foreign national related cases (Boston 
Borough Council, 2012). 
 
This is something that the national press later picked up on however, with the Daily Mail 
writing an article that mentioned the cases listed in The Boston Standard‘…two thirds have 
names such as Zumbrickij and Kazombiase. Most offences are for drink-driving and other 
motoring offences. British names, it should be noted, still lead the section for assaults’. 
(Hardman, 2013). 
 
There was acknowledgement in the council report that there was a difference between the 
local and national press, and was specific reference to an article written by the Daily Mail. 
This is referring to a now infamous article where the town was referred to as ‘Boston 
Lincolngrad’ by the right-wing commentator Peter Hitchens. This article was highly critical 
of the mass immigration to the town in recent years. 
 
Note here that I use the word ‘immigration’, not ‘immigrants’. All the people who have been 
hurt, uprooted and upset by this rather cynical piece of social engineering are pretty much 
free of blame. (Hitchens, 2011). 
 
Whilst the article suggested that the immigrants that had come to Boston were decent and 
hardworking, and that most of the criticism should be pointed at the previous Labour 
government, it painted a very negative picture of the town and of its perceived problems. He 
put the problems of the ‘British louts’ in the town down to a soft education system and 
welfarism, whilst the newcomers who were described as being drunk, urinating in the street 
and driving uninsured and over the limit were arriving from ‘…70 years of miserable 
communism, deliberate demoralisation and a culture of desperation and drunken oblivion. 
(Hitchens, 2011). 
 
The Hardman article followed up on the amount of Eastern Europeans in the town and further 
developed another story that the Daily Mail had published relating to a television appearance 
on the flagship BBC political programme Question Time in January 2013. Audience member 
Rachel Bull, a local from Boston, insisted that the town was at breaking point and couldn’t 
cope any longer because of the huge levels of migration, but was dismissed by panel member 
Mary Beard, an academic from Cambridge University, and told that the claims were simply 
myths. Following this an article was printed in the Daily Mail about the show ‘Our town's 
like a foreign country and locals can't cope with the immigrants, says mother after TV clash 
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with academic on Question Time’ (Stevens, 2013). Mary Beard was later subjected to a 
significant amount of online abuse following the show and the subsequent reaction to it. 
 
The Labour MEP Mary Honeyball has criticised the amount of time that UKIP, and in 
particular Nigel Farage have been given on Question Time. Between December 4
th
 2008 and 
22
nd
 November 2012, Nigel Farage had appeared as a panel guest on the show more times 
than any other person (11 times), with the exception of the Business Secretary at the time 
Vince Cable (12 times). Farage’s deputy Paul Nuttall appeared twice. Honeyball points out 
that this is more than all of the trade union representatives combined and suggests that ‘…the 
individual and political party represented on Question Time gains credibility in a way it 
would be difficult to achieve otherwise.’ (Honeyball, 2012). This would support the theory 
put forward by Hopmann et al about visibility and tone, but also backs up Usherwood’s point 
about coverage leading to better polling and then subsequently more coverage, as well as 
Bos’s hypothesis giving Farage more ‘authoritativeness’ by putting him regularly on par with 
established politicians and government ministers. 
 
In  November 2012, Boston saw the staging of the ‘Boston Protest’. This protest had been 
organised by a group for a previous date, but had been postponed after the Borough Council 
agreed to look into the migration situation – which involved the production of the social 
impact report. There had been concern that the protest would be hijacked by the far-right, but 
in the end it was described as a ‘peaceful demonstration’ and the 300 strong event went off 
without incident (BBC News, 2012). 
 
In September 2012 Boston again made national news, with The Sun and The Express running 
a story about a migrant in the town claiming a large amount in welfare. ‘BRITAIN's soft touch 
benefits system was laid bare yesterday after it emerged a Latvian mother-of-10 rakes in 
£34,000 a year in state handouts – and is now demanding a bigger house.’ (Reynolds, 2012). 
The Express is first newspaper in recent history to actively call for UK withdrawal from the 
EU, so they would support some of UKIP’s aims, as Dr Ashton suggested. 
 
The most recent high profile press before the local elections that should be focused on is the 
visit to Boston of UKIP leader Nigel Farage however. Farage received widespread local 
coverage of his visit, and a meeting he spoke at was said to have been ‘packed’. The Boston 
Standard gave this visit extensive coverage. During this meeting he once again managed to 
link local issues with the European Union. In the case of Boston he spoke of immigration, EU 
fishing rules and wind turbines being key election issues. He also called for work permits for 
immigration and said, as Professor Craig did in the ‘demographic’ section of this thesis, he 
could see why people were coming to Boston to work. Once again however, he managed to 
raise the issue of immigrant workers from Bulgaria and Romania being on their way to the 
area soon “If I was a young Bulgarian I would be packing my bags now.” He also urged 
‘moderation’ when it comes to the language and actions of people in the town when it comes 
to the topic. (Brookes, 2013b). This last point shows how Farage is trying to behave in a 
manner similar to that of mainstream politicians, and once again how he is trying not to 
behave in an extraordinary manner (Bos, 2012). He still manages to mix this successfully 
with populist rhetoric however, going on to say that ‘…there is a feeling that we are not 
putting the needs of our own people first.” (Brookes, 2013b). 
 
What is most noticeable from this section of the thesis and the focus on Boston is actually the 
lack of media coverage of local politics and politicians generally. The vast majority of 
articles in the national media were related to the immigration situation in Boston and were 
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almost all of a negative editorial slant. Most of the local coverage of UKIP as a party has also 
been after the local elections, and before this was mainly limited to quotes alongside those 
from other parties. The main coverage appears to have created a climate whereby the visit of 
Nigel Farage a month before the election made major local news, and once again gave him a 
level of ‘authoritativeness’ (Bos, 2012). In a small town, the visit of a political leader is 
always likely to make the news, although in this case he was also addressing issues that were 
very much UKIP’s ‘territory’ in terms of the immigration situation specifically regarding 
those coming from the European Union. Newly elected UKIP councillor Sue Ransome 
suggested in the ‘political’ section of this thesis that Farage’s media profile and his visits to 
Lincolnshire contributed to their success in the area. 
 
7.0 – Discussion and conclusions  
 
This thesis set out to explain the success of the United Kingdom Independence Party in the 
2013 local elections, with a focus on the Lincolnshire town of Boston. The thesis started by 
looking at previous research into: euroscepticism; immigration and its effect on votes for 
populist parties in the rest of Europe; UKIP’s history, its supporters and its leader Nigel 
Farage; and finally the national picture in the UK in terms of elections. Following this a 
theoretical framework was devised around the case study model, and three hypotheses were 
outlined that would be tested in the thesis under three macro headings. 
 
The first hypothesis from Arzheimer & Carter suggested that low turnouts benefitted right-
wing parties. To test this I analysed local election results for Lincolnshire County Council, 
not just from 2013, but also from previous years too. This also included results from the 
Boston Borough Council elections. I also analysed what politicians thought the key issues 
were before the election, and what they thought influenced the results after the election. This 
was done in order to establish why turnout may have been low, and to be able to help explain 
the data. 
 
We found that there had been a drop in turnout for every council ward in the Boston area, and 
that the Conservative vote in particular had suffered, allowing UKIP to overtake them in most 
of the council wards. When compared with previous elections, it was also clear that there was 
an opportunity for smaller parties like UKIP to gain a foothold, although they could never 
sustain this in subsequent elections, for example the English Democrats, the British National 
Party and The Boston Bypass Independents. This also supports Arzheimer & Carter’s point 
about second order elections being a ‘security valve’ allowing voters to show their frustration 
with mainstream parties, but in effect giving smaller parties little chance of sustained success 
when national elections are held. 
 
One of the main factors that appeared from the results was the lack of political competition, 
especially from some of the more mainstream parties, to the Conservatives. This appears to 
have been a contributory factor to the low turnouts, and also could explain UKIP sweeping up 
the independent vote. In the parts of Lincolnshire where the Labour Party had a stronger 
presence and there were Liberal Democrat candidates, UKIP enjoyed less success. Local 
politicians appeared to agree that the public had been turned off by national politicians and 
what they perceived as a ‘political elite’. This may also explain the low turnout. Arzheimer & 
Carter’s hypothesis can therefore be supported by the evidence in this section. 
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The second hypothesis focused on immigration and tested the theory of Halla, Wagner & 
Zweimuller that populist votes increased not just when there was an increase in the immigrant 
population, but also that the votes for populist parties increased when the immigrants were 
lower or medium skilled workers. I combined this with the theory of Warmenbol, that areas 
surrounding these districts were also more likely to support populist parties due to the ‘ink-
blot’ theory. To test this I used data from the 2011 Census, as well as material from Research 
Lincolnshire and Boston Borough Council’s report on the Social Impact of Population 
Change. 
 
The demographic data for Lincolnshire suggested that it fitted the profile for those who 
typically supported UKIP, according to the research from Kellner (2013). Much of the 
demographic change to Boston has been recent, which could support some of Warmebol’s 
arguments, and many of the jobs in the area tend to be lower skilled work, such as 
agriculture. As Professor Craig pointed out, many of these jobs are undesirable and some 
even pay less than minimum wage, deterring locals from taking them. The skills set of the 
immigrant population therefore tends to be made up of lower skilled workers, supporting the 
hypothesis of Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller. A look at the political map of Lincolnshire in our 
previous section also shows UKIP successes in the bordering areas, suggesting that 
Warmebol’s ‘ink-blot’ theory and assertion that these areas see themselves as being under 
threat may also be apparent. 
 
Interestingly, UKIP’s successes in Lincolnshire is almost identical to the map showing the 
2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation. The areas seen as being the most deprived were the ones 
that UKIP were the most successful in. Equally interesting was The Economist’s map of 
England that showed the areas that considered themselves as English rather than British, as 
this once again had a striking resemblance. These people tend to be more hostile to 
immigration and likely to vote for right-wing parties such as UKIP. 
 
The third hypothesis set out to test the effect of UKIP’s media presence. Usherwood stated 
that more media coverage leads to better polling and in turn to more coverage. Hopmann et al 
found that the more visible a party was during elections and the more positive the tone 
towards them, the more likely people are to vote for them, not because of direct exposure but 
instead because of the ‘information environment’. Bos found that the more successful 
populist leaders were the ones that came across as being more authoritative, and similar to 
established party leaders. Incorporating Hopmann et al’s work then, I set out to test whether 
UKIP’s coverage and the tone of it had a positive effect on their election results. I then 
included Nigel Farage within this analysis, using the theory of Linda Bos. To test this I 
interviewed a leading local academic expert on media politics, once again analysed Boston 
Borough Council’s report, and also used various articles from the local and national media. 
 
Dr. Ashton suggested in his interview that UKIP were disproportionally represented and were 
currently more visible and experiencing a more favourable tone from the media. This backs 
up Hopmann et al’s theory. Others have also suggested UKIP have been over represented, 
comparing their coverage with other parties, such as the Greens. Like Usherwood, he felt that 
UKIP had successfully ‘piggy backed’ on issues such as the economy and immigration, 
becoming more ‘authoritative’ as a result, in line with Linda Bos’s hypothesis. 
 
Analysis of the media reports on Boston suggested that many of the articles about the town in 
the national press were focused on immigration and were of a generally negative nature. 
Programmes such as Question Time had also led to negative publicity for the town because of 
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its immigration levels, and this was also highlighted as a show where Nigel Farage had made 
an excessive number of personal appearances, once again adding to his ‘authoritativeness’. 
Farage’s visit to Boston made major local news barely a month before the local elections, and 
a UKIP councillor believed that it was his media profile and his visits to the area that 
contributed to their success. Again, it could therefore be argued that Hopmann et al’s 
hypotheses on visibility and tone, combined with that of Bos in the case of Farage, have also 
been demonstrated. 
 
From our testing it is clear that there is evidence to support all three hypotheses in one form 
or another. However, do some matter more than others and if so, which? The testing of the 
first hypothesis showed a low turnout for the local elections, and that the Conservatives in 
particular suffered from a lack of turnout from their own supporters. The increased UKIP 
vote clearly did not just come from disaffected Conservatives. The lack of political 
competition therefore appears to have helped UKIP, who sucked up the independent vote. If 
we look at our second hypothesis it is also clear that there has been significant UKIP support 
in areas with high levels of low skilled immigration, and that this has spread to surrounding 
areas. However, these areas also have a lack of political competition in comparison to other 
areas of Lincolnshire, and this could once again serve as an explanation for the low turnout 
and the success of UKIP. As Dr. Ashton has suggested, it could also be that the economic 
situation in some of these areas could be a more important factor than immigration. The 
Index of Deprivation from 2010 could also support this theory. What of the media coverage 
received by UKIP though? There has been acknowledgement that this has helped the party in 
Boston, especially from its own councillors. It is clear that when people think of UKIP, they 
think of Nigel Farage, and it may be that Farage’s presence made all the difference in giving 
the UKIP vote the extra lift it needed. However, even with this lift, if the Conservative vote 
had not failed to turnout then they would have more than likely held on, despite the surge in 
support for UKIP. 
 
 
8.0 - Further Research 
 
To gain a further insight into the reasons why UKIP were successful in Boston I would like to 
conduct a micro-analysis of each of the different council wards to see if circumstances varied 
and they could each be explained by different or common factors. This would be difficult for 
me at this moment in time however, for the ethical reasons outlined in my methodological 
section. 
 
Whilst I have conducted a general analysis of issues in the town, an interview section with 
members of the public would be useful. This could involve me conducting a basic set of 
semi-structured interviews to try and gather what local people think and what their 
perspectives are. This could be done to try and gain some further perspective on any findings 
that have already been made from previous sections in my research. Asking basic questions 
related to political, demographic and media related subjects, such as who they normally vote 
for, their ages and what newspapers they read could be useful. The semi-structured nature of 
the questions will allow the researcher to go into more depth and find out the reasons why 
they have given certain answer. For example, if they have voted for UKIP or not voted at all, 
rather than for their usual choice, then they could find out specific reasons. They may also 
provide a different insight into some of the local issues, or at least their perceptions of local 
issues, than newspapers or politicians would. This could therefore act as a validation exercise 
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of previous analyses. There could also be a more detailed analysis of the role of the media 
and of different articles that have been published, as my section was intended to only be a 
general analysis. 
 
The future successes or failures of UKIP will also no doubt play a part in further research, 
and with the European Elections in 2014 and the next UK General Election in 2015 there will 
surely be many further opportunities to test new and existing hypotheses. 
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(Lincolnshire County Council, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
(ii)  
Interview with Dr. Matthew Ashton in full 
 
Interview with Dr. Matthew Ashton from Nottingham Trent University. 
 
1) What role do you feel the media has had in the success of UKIP nationally? 
 
I think that the media has played quite a significant role in bringing UKIP's views and policies to a 
national audience. Because of Duverger's Law Britain remains a 2 or 2.5 party system. Therefore in 
the past it has been very difficult for minor political parties to make any sort of impact. The media 
take the view that the party won't do well in an election and so they receive very little press 
coverage. UKIP have managed to break this circle for a number of reasons: 
 
1) Holding views that the owners of some large media companies agree with (anti-Europeanism etc). 
2) Having a charismatic frontman in Nigel Farage. In an age of career politicians who are often 
perceived as being dull/identical, Farage is what we in Britain often call 'a character' eg he speaks his 
mind a lot. In this sense he's a bit like Boris Johnson. Of course this approach also carries risks.  
3) The British media thrive on novelty and at the moment UKIP seems to be offering something new 
hence they receive more coverage. 
4) The British media thrive on bad news and conflict. UKIP is causing serious conflict and problems in 
the Conservative party (eg how they respond to the UKIP threat/deflections etc). As a result this gets 
a lot of coverage. 
5) UKIP has a lot of maverick politicians and this means that there is always the risk of scandal/gaffes 
which sells newspapers. 
 
2) Do you feel that UKIP have received a proportionate amount of publicity with regards to their 
size and their popularity? 
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I think that they've received a hugely disproportionate amount of coverage considering their poll 
ratings and actual electoral success. For instance the Green Party has one MP and doesn't get 
anywhere near as much coverage as UKIP do. The big question is whether UKIP can keep this 
momentum up. They do well in EU elections but if they fail to win any of the next GE then it will be 
hard to keep up claims that they have momentum on their side. 
 
3) To what extent is Nigel Farage responsible for UKIP's media image, and do you think this has 
been a positive or negative thing for the party? 
 
The trouble with Farage is that his dominance of UKIP stories is that it runs the risk of making the 
party look a bit like a one man band. In the popular imagination Farage is UKIP. That's fine to a 
certain extent if you intend your party to be a single issue party. However if you want to be seen as a 
serious party of government you need more spokespeople/big figures. Also because they rely on 
Farage so much it would cause problems if he was incapacitated for any length of time. 
 
4) UKIP have been able to approach the immigration issue and appear on programmes such as 
Question Time without the same amount of opposition as other parties have in the past, e.g. BNP. 
Why do you think they have managed this? 
 
Mainly because the BNP is a far right fascist party and UKIP has so for managed to stay on the right 
side of political perception of that issues (despite the activities of some of its members). At the 
moment UKIP have managed to focus their views on immigration almost entirely around the EU and 
have mostly managed to avoid talking about the tricky issue of race (although they can't do this 
forever). 
 
5) To what extent do you feel UKIP have relied on being a eurosceptic party? Are there other 
issues that they push that may explain their success, e.g. being anti-establishment etc? (in polls I 
have noticed that Europe has a fairly low salience as an issue, but the economy and immigration 
were the top 2. Has Farage managed to link the EU to both of these successfully?) 
 
I think Farage has been successful at linking both to the EU. They've also had some success pushing 
the anti-establishment line as well as traditional Tory issues eg their opposition to gay marriage. The 
trouble is that now gay marriage is on the books it will be difficult for Farage to promise to repeal it. 
 
The problem with the party being focused on EU/immigration/economy is that they're doing well at 
the moment because of our economic situation. Once the economy improves will they still manage 
to attract the same support? Highly debatable. 
 
6) What kind of publicity for other political parties has contributed most to UKIP's success? 
 
Anything involving bad data eg economic or immigration. Farage tends to avoid going after 
parties/politicians on certain gaffes (I think), because his own party is so vulnerable in this area. 
 
7) What effect do you feel UKIP's success in byelections, such as Eastleigh, have had on their 
credibility in the media and their prospects or portraying themselves as serious electoral 
contenders rather than just also-rans? 
 
I think Eastleigh was a tricky one for Farage and UKIP. On the one hand they came second, but on 
the other they didn't win and in the UK there isn't a prize for second place. It also underlined the 
party’s lack of big figures. UKIP got a huge amount of publicity during the Eastleigh campaign but it 
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was almost all centred on Farage. I suspect most people had no idea who the candidate even was 
and voted for the party rather than the person. 
 
8) Have recent defections of politicians from other parties, such as Roger Helmer in the East 
Midlands, added to the credibility of UKIP as a serious political force? 
 
I don't think so no. Helmer was quite old and not a rising force in the Conservatives (also a 
maverick). I think it probably helped UKIP but not by that much. 
 
9) In Lincolnshire during the May local elections, UKIP made significant gains- especially in Boston. 
What factors do you think could explain these results? (Nigel Farage making a high profile visit 
there, 'the Boston protest', the Question Time programme where a Boston resident complained 
about the situation in the town, the changing demographics, the negative press Boston has 
received in the press such as the Mail and Express etc., the independent nature of Boston 
electorally - they have elected pro-bypass and English Democrat councillors before at various 
levels, the lack of a strong Labour or Liberal challenge in the area, the election being fought on 
national rather than local issues, the timing of the Euro crisis and subsequent debates). 
 
I think of all those issues could have played a role. I think that the EU/financial crisis was probably 
the most important though. 
 
10) Why were they successful in some specific areas rather than others? e.g. other areas with high 
migration levels. 
 
Depends on the specific area. In some places with high immigration the economic situation is better 
or the other main parties have stronger roots. 
 
11) Is UKIP's success likely to make things more difficult for them in the future, especially in terms 
of media scrutiny? 
 
Absolutely. They're going to get a lot more scrutiny in the future and events like the Godfrey Bloom 
gaffe will get much more media mileage. 
 
